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  The research problem to be dealt with here is the international political 
thought of John Stuart Mill.1) In specific, this is a two-part problem: the 
first part pertains to the preliminary question of what should constitute the 
proper concept of Mill’s international political thought, or philosophy of 
international politics, in the truest sense; and the second part is the primary 
question of what is, then, the substance of Mill’s true international political 
thought as properly understood in the first part. This research problem is 
particularly important because of the fact that there has been an absence of 
any comprehensive study on Mill’s international political thought thus far.2) 
This is a research problem that must be further inquired into because Mill 
perceived of himself as being a consistent and systematic thinker throughout 
the entirety of his life.3) Thus, it is necessary and possible to reconstruct a 
general body, or a “Millian” theory of international politics that is logically 
consistent with his central philosophical and political philosophical views. 
This is a project to which there has been an absence of inquiry into thus 
1) Hereafter referred to simply as Mill.
2) Georgios Varouxakis, 2017, Liberty Abroad, 1st ed. [S.l.]: Cambridge University Press, 
pp.1-18.
3) See J.S. Mill, The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill,  general editor F. E. L. Priestley 
and subsequently John M. Robson (The University of Toronto Press, 1963-1991) [hereafter 
referrred to as: CW, followed by volume number in Roman numerals and by page 
number/s in Arabic numerals], I, p.163, 175. In this particular part of Mill’s 
Autobiography, he clearly states that he never intended for his views on substantive 
issues such as political institutions or policies to be principles of action. Rather, he 
viewed his substantive views as being highly provisional conclusions. Furthermore, 
Mill clearly states that the true legacy he wishes to leave behind is his key political 
philosophical principles from which further generations can also deduce their 
necessary provisional conclusions on policy, institutions, etc. 
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far, as will be shown in the literature review. For the purpose of refining 
the objective of this research, the dual problems mentioned above will be 
explained in more detail below.
 The preliminary problem must necessarily be dealt in order to illustrate the 
necessity of attempting to complete a caricature of Mill’s philosophy of 
international politics. This is because the endeavor of imaginatively sketching 
a Millian theory of international politics thought solely from his 
philosophical and political philosophical endeavors is one that has not yet 
been attempted before. In fact, it will be shown in the literature review that 
the question of Mill’s views on the relationship between empire (to a much 
lesser degree, non-intervention) and his main political philosophical 
arguments has monopolized studies on Mill’s international political thought 
thus far. It is in light of this problem that a most recent trend has begun in 
attempting to establish a more general Millian theory of international 
politics, and not just his thoughts on empire and non-intervention. However, 
this one transitional attempt by Georgios Varouxakis in expanding the 
limited scope of research on Mill’s international political thought has been  
restricted to simply the widening of the number of international political 
problems that Mill dealt with. In other words, the focus of Varouxakis has 
mostly been simply the historical compilation, or aggregation of the 
historical Mill’s stances on a multitude of foreign policy issues with which 
Mill dealt with throughout his life.4) This deprived state of affairs in 
attempting to approximate a Millian philosophy and theory of international 
politics necessarily requires that the problem be defined more concretely. 
When we speak of establishing Mill’s international political thought, what do 
we mean by “international political thought?” Do we mean Mill’s stances on 
a variety of foreign affairs issues that he actively dealt with during his life 
4) Ibid., (Geogios Varouxakis, 2017, Liberty Abroad), p.1-18 
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as an active parliamentarian or political practitioner? Or does it refer to 
some kind of philosophy, or theory of international politics? If it is the 
latter case, then is it appropriate and possible at all to somehow reconstruct 
Mill’s philosophy of international politics? These are the types of questions 
that must necessarily precede any task of searching for Mill’s international 
political thought in general. 
  Once the preliminary problem is first dealt with, it is only then that the 
primary problem of reimagining the substance of a Millian philosophy of 
international politics can be addressed. This problem deals with the logical 
yet careful extension of Mill’s thoughts on the relationship between the 
individual, the state or the political collectivity, and of the international 
society or humanity as a whole. It is essentially a problem of reconstructing 
a Millian theory of international politics, of which the bulk of the argument 
is projected in the fifth chapter of this dissertation. In essence, this kind of 
endeavor would in a sense be doing both the historical and philosophical 
Mills justice; it would be true to Mill’s desires for his philosophy to 
transcend his actions.
2. Argument and Method
  To the dual problem previously mentioned, the main argument is as 
follows. Firstly, Mill’s international political thought should not simply be 
the historical aggregation or compilation of Mill’s views on particular issues 
of foreign policy, but also the reconstruction of Mill’s philosophy of 
international politics from his central philosophical and political philosophical 
works: A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive; Autobiography; and 
Utilitarianism.5) It is thus the argument that Mill never intended for his 
stances on numerous foreign policy issues to comprise any kind of general 
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theory of international politics. In fact, it is impossible to construct a theory 
of international politics from Mill’s foreign policy views as a political 
practitioner alone, in contradistinction to a political philosopher. 
  Second, and more importantly, it is argued that Mill’s international 
political thought consists of the central idea that progress in all human 
affairs is not possible without the designation of utility as a cosmopolitan 
morality that is consistently applied through all levels of human affairs, 
from humanity and the world down to the individual. This argument is 
deduced directly from Mill’s central philosophical and political philosophical 
works: System of Logic, Autobiography, and Utilitarianism. The main reasons 
behind this argument are that Mill’s philosophical theory of the principle, of 
the human mind, and of progress logically lead to this conclusion; and that 
the utilitarian argument presupposes the necessity of designating the 
utilitarian standard as a principle consistently in international politics. 
  For the sake of argumentation, the following method will be utilized for 
each of the two problems. For the preliminary problem, the proper 
interpretation of Mill’s concepts of the Art of Life, and of science, will be 
understood through his essay, Of the Logic of Practice, or Art; Including 
Morality and Policy.6) A careful rereading of this essay on the Art of Life 
and Science will shed light upon why Mill’s foreign policy stances were 
meant to be only provisional and limited by Mill’s time and space, and thus 
cannot be a perennial body of thought upon which Mill’s general theory of 
international politics can be established. Furthermore, a careful reading of A 
System of Logic will reveal that it was well within the intentions of Mill 
that the inquirer of his thoughts necessarily utilize his main principles to 
find for themselves the answers to their inquiries, so long as it relates to 
5) A System of Logic, Ratiocinative, and Inductive will hereafter be referred to as System 
of Logic.
6) Hereafter referred to as Art of Life..
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human affairs. This is the method through which the argument pertaining to 
the preliminary problem will be addressed.
  Once then the preliminary argument is established, the primary argument 
of the substance of Mill’s international political theory will be addressed. 
The method through which this argument will be made is as follows. First, 
the central arguments of System of Logic and the Autobiography will be 
established through a careful reading. The conclusive logic of these 
interpretations will then be used to consistently reread Mill’s central political 
philosophical argument of Utilitarianism. It is this order in which they are 
read because the utilitarian argument is but a partial component of the Art 
of Life as explained in System of Logic. This will be explained in full 
detail in the second chapter of the dissertation. Third, the possibility of 
deducing from the aforementioned arguments, a philosophy of international 
politics will be assessed. This means that there must be, explicitly and 
implicitly, an inherently international element presupposed in Mill’s main 
philosophical views and political philosophical arguments. After finally 
reaching the conclusion that there is indeed this indispensible international 
factor inherent in main’s philosophical and political philosophical arguments, 
an attempt to approximate a Millian theory of international politics will be 
made. These are the methods through which the two arguments will be 
made. 
  
3. Literature Review 
  Literature thus far on the international political thought of John Stuart 
Mill can be categorized into mainly three groups. The first group consists of 
political theorists such as Jennifer Pitts, Uday Mehta, Pratap Bhanu Mehta, 
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Karuna Mantena, Michael Walzer, Michael W. Doyle, and Charles R. Beitz. 
These political theorists residing in the US are all occupied with either of 
two endeavors: the flaws inherent in Mill’s political philosophy that 
inherently lead to an erroneous justification of empire; or with reconstructing 
the broader liberal stance exclusively on the basis of an in-text interpretation 
of a rather short essay by Mill, A Few Words on Non-Intervention.7) The 
former group of literature is preoccupied with citing the flaws inherent in 
Mill’s political philosophy of utilitarianism and liberalism, as well as his 
dichotomous distinction of civilization and barbarism in his work, On 
Liberty, that ultimately led to the wrongful and forceful imposition of 
despotism through imperial rule in the barbarous societies.8) The latter group 
is concerned with extracting the broader liberal stance on non-intervention so 
as to make it contemporarily relevant to pressing issues of intervention 
today. They agree that, as Walzer claims, that Mill is speaking “directly to 
current U.S. debate about foreign policy and international society.”9) They 
justify contemporary international practices most definitely outside of the 
7) Hereafter referred to as A Few Words.
8) See: Mehta, Uday Singh. Liberalism and Empire: A Study in Nineteenth-Century 
British Liberal Thought (The University of Chicago Press, 1999); Muthu, Sankar. 
Enlightenment against Empire (Princeton University Press, 2003); Parekh, Bhikhu. 
‘Decolonizing Liberalism’, in: Aleksandras Shtromas (ed.), The End of ‘Isms’? 
Reflections on the Fate of Ideological Politics after Communism’s Collapse (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1994), pp. 85-103; Pitts, Jennifer. A Turn to Empire: The Rise of Imperial 
Liberalism in Britain and France (Princeton University Press, 2005); Pitts, Jennifer. 
‘The Boundaries of Victorian international law’, in: Duncan Bell (ed.), Victorian 
Visions of Global Order: Empire and International Relations in Nineteenth-Century 
Political Thought (Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp.67-88; Pitts Jennifer. 
‘Empire and legal universalisms in the eighteenth century’, The American Historical 
Review, Vol. 117, No. I (2012), pp. 92-121; Tunick, Mark. ‘Tolerant imperialism: 
John Stuart Mill’s defense of British rule in India’, The Review of Politics, Vol. 68 
(2006), pp. 586-611.
9) Michael Walzer, 2007, ‘Mill’s “A Few Words on Non-intervention”: a commentary’, 
in: Nadia Urbinati and Alex Zakaras (eds), J. S. Mill’s Political Thought: A 
Bicentennial Reassessment Cambridge University Press, pp. 347-56
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concerns of the historical John Stuart Mill such as humanitarian intervention 
as it is conceived today, and the Responsibility to Protect (R2P).10) Other 
theorists such as Beitz and Ikenberry directly receive such contemporary 
interpretations and build upon it to answer their own theoretical questions 
such as state and autonomy.11) These endeavors are fundamentally flawed in 
the following respects. The first group preoccupied with Mill and empire is 
flawed in mainly two aspects. First, they cannot neglect, or are totally 
unaware of the philosophical logic in A System of Logic that makes the 
fundamental distinction between rules of conduct and the principles of moral 
doctrine.12) In doing so, they mistake Mill’s take on empire and civilization 
as having been the direct consequence of a flawed political philosophical 
argument of utility or of liberty.13) The substantive views of Mill on issues 
of foreign policy such as empire and of civilization are results of his 
wrongful scientific inquiries, not his philosophy. This point will be 
extensively covered in the fourth chapter of this dissertation. Secondly, this 
group has no perception of the general theory of international politics from 
which Mill deduces his provisional stances on substantive foreign policy 
issues due to their overt attention to solely the topic of empire. They never 
were able to conceive of the necessity of first thinking about the general 
theory or philosophy of international politics of Mill as a necessary stage 
before conversing other more substantive themes. 
10) Michael W. Doyle, 2015, The question of intervention: John Stuart Mill and the 
responsibility to protect / Michael W. Doyle, (Castle lectures in ethics, politics, and 
economics), New Haven: Yale University Press, pp. 12-34
11) Charles Beitz, 1979, Political Theory and International Relations, Princeton University 
Press pp. 83-92, pp.191-198; and John G. Ikenberry, 2015, Political and Legal, 
Foreign Affairs, 94(6), Foreign Affairs, 2015, Vol.94(6).
12) CW, VIII, pp.943-952
13) Mehta, Uday Singh. Liberalism and Empire: A Study in Nineteenth-Century British 
Liberal Thought (The University of Chicago Press, 1999); Pitts, Jennifer. A Turn to 
Empire: The Rise of Imperial Liberalism in Britain and France (Princeton University 
Press, 2005)
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 The second group of literature on non-intervention is shortsighted because 
they constantly utilize contemporary concepts in interpreting the original text 
of A Few Words alone that contradict the historical context and original 
intention with which John Stuart Mill wrote them. Such a method is open 
to a number of problems. First, it is highly unlikely that A Few Words 
alone was a definitive view of Mill on a “principle” of non-intervention. 
Second, even if ‘A Few Words’ is to be considered as the authoritative text 
of Mill on non-intervention, the text itself is practically meaningless without 
the incorporation of Mill’s larger body of works into the interpretive 
process, as mentioned by Varouxakis himself but never fully developed.14) 
Lastly, and most importantly, they, like the first group, commit the same 
mistake of not comprehending the provisional nature of Mill’s stance on 
non-intervention or any other issue of foreign policy. They commit the 
gravest of errors by deducing from this provisional stance on 
non-intervention a “principle,” or the “principles of non-intervention” for 
contemporary usage.15) They have no knowledge whatsoever of the concept 
of the principle which Mill intended to be used, and this is attributable to 
an absence of a careful reading of A System of Logic.  
  On the contrary, the second group of literature is that which specializes in 
the history of political thought; they pay special attention to Mill’s textual 
arguments as well as Mill’s historical situation in which the text was 
written, and also the interactions between Mill and his contemporaries in 
regards to the relevant text, letter, or speech. In so doing, Varouxakis 
revives the historical Mill with meticulous attention to historical details.16) 
Varouxakis then brilliantly restores Mill’s stances on substantive themes of 
foreign policy including not only non-intervention (which was admittedly 
14) Ibid., (Geogios Varouxakis, 2017, Liberty Abroad), p. 81.
15) Ibid., (Geogios Varouxakis, 2017, Liberty Abroad), pp. 96-98.
16) Ibid.
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still a major concern to Mill the parliamentarian) and empire, but also on 
themes such as that of international law or the idea of nationality that Mill 
is documented to have held in high importance.17) As a result, Varouxakis 
has begun the most recent trend of surveying Mill’s international political 
thoughts generally, and has opened up the venue for much more extensive 
research that could possibly culminate in a more systematic body of 
international political thought of John Stuart Mill. However, Varouxakis 
seems to fail in one particular aspect. By overemphasizing the historical 
features of John Stuart Mill in which he views Mill as but a political 
commentator whose texts reflect mere vacillations of mind, Varouxakis 
undermines any possibility at reconstructing a logically coherent body of 
international political thought, or philosophy.18) This view is problematic in 
light of the third group of vast, comprehensive literature since the 1970’s up 
until the 1990’s that arguably succeeded in proving that Mill was, or 
rigorously endeavored to transcend his time and space; he was a philosopher 
whose aim was to produce an internally coherent, universally applicable, and 
architechtonic body of political philosophical thought. Put simply, the 
shortcoming of Varouxakis’ approach is that he has killed the philosophical 
Mill in exchange for the historical Mill, and he has interpreted the historical 
Mill as being the only identity of Mill that matters in establishing a general 
body of his international political thought. Of course, this is in contradiction 
to Mill’s intention for his lasting legacy to be the philosophical Mill, not 
the provisional and somewhat narrow-minded historical Mill. 
  The third group is similar to the second in terms of their emphasis on 
the necessity of paying attention to the historical Mill, but with a greater 
focus on the most comprehensive canonical texts of Mill such as 
Utilitarianism, System of Logic, and Considerations of Representative 
17) Ibid., pp. 19-43, pp. 44-76.
18) Ibid., pp.98-99, pp. 184-187.
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Government.19) The main theme of their intense debates dealt with the 
possibility of bridging together the seemingly contradictory Principle of 
Liberty and the Principle of Utility. The significance of this endeavor for 
the reproduction of Mill’s international political thought is paramount 
because it is only through the proper establishment of Mill’s key political 
philosophical works that a subsequently coherent body of works on Mill’s 
international political thought may emerge. To this end, Alan Ryan 
enlightens us on the key role played by Mill’s Art of Life as to which 
Mill’s Principle of Liberty in On Liberty, and the Principle of Utility, or the 
ultimate teleological principle of happiness as proposed in Mill’s 
Utilitarianism, is a constituting element.20) Furthermore, John Gray’s 
interpretation of Mill’s utilitarianism as a species of indirect utilitarianism 
allows for its harmonization with Mill’s Principle of Liberty.21) The critical 
contribution of this group of political philosophers relying heavily on the 
philosophical method, is that they have done justice to Mill the philosopher 
by interpreting Mill’s thoughts in the context of his main philosophical 
arguments. They emphasize that Mill was a sincere and “earnest” thinker 
who endeavored to always maintain consistency: he tried to align his actions 
as a political practitioner with his philosophical thoughts; and establish a 
coherent system of philosophical thoughts.22) The only regrettable point 
about this group is that they have not yet attempted to extend their 
19) For Mill’s Utilitarianism, see J.S. Mill, John Stuart Mill: On Liberty and Other Essays, 
edited with an introduction and Notes by John Gray (Oxford University Press, 1991) 
[hereafter referred to as Essays, followed by page number/s in Arabic numerals].
20) For a comprehensive collection of discussions by Isaiah Berlin, Alan Ryan, J. C. 
Rees, John Gray, C. L. Ten, G. W. Smith, and Richard Wollheim on the 
compatibility and relationship between Mill’s Principle of Utility, Principle of Liberty, 
and the Art of Life, see, John Gray & G. W. Smith, 1991, J. S. Mill's on Liberty in 
Focus, London: Routledge. 
21) Ibid., (John Gray & G. W. Smith, 1991, J. S. Mill's on Liberty in Focus), pp. 
190-211.
22) CW, I, p.163, 175
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philosophical basis of Mill’s arguments to more substantive issues such as 
international politics as of yet. However, they have grown closer to it over 
the years by gradually covering an increasingly diverse number of 
substantive themes including diversity and gender equality.
  To sum up, the main goal is to reconstruct a Millian theory of 
international politics that is historically accurate in the sense that it remains 
true to the original intentions of Mill. In other words, the interpretive 
approach of the proposed research is a combination of the second and third 
group of literature with a greater emphasis on the second group, while 
keeping a distance from the first group. The second group’s approaches are 
used so as to avoid the problems of the “mythology of doctrines” and 
overambitious linkages to contemporary issues. However it is only to the 
extent that this approach warns of overinterpretation, and provides historical 
details conducive to better understanding the intentions of Mill, that this 
approach is of any use. In fact, it will be shown in this dissertation that the 
most historical accurate interpretation of Mill is that he intended for his 
philosophical and political philosophical works to be utilized by successive 
generations to deduce their own conclusions on whatever subject of human 
affairs is to be inquired into. This is synonymous with the preliminary 
argument of the dissertation. The third group of literature thus allows for 
the excavation of Mill’s international political thoughts that are logically 
consistent with his canonical works. Thus, it is through the combination of 
the two approaches with a greater emphasis on the philosophical approach 
that a historical version of Mill the philosopher may be successfully revived, 
and from which can be reconstructed, a Millian philosophy of international 
politics.
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II. Mill’s Concepts of Principle and Progress
  
  Now having concretely defined the research problem and the method of 
approach through which this dissertation seeks to reconstruct the international 
political thought of John Stuart Mill, it will immediately begin with a 
rereading of Mill’s key philosophical views. To rephrase what was briefly 
mentioned in the introduction, this particular rereading is crucial because of 
the following reasons. First, it is only through a close inspection of Mill’s 
key philosophical views that we can comprehend the key distinction between 
principle, or ends, and the rules of practice for the substantive themes with 
which Mill dealt. It is only on the basis of this distinction that one can 
approximate Mill’s true intention of clearing Mill of the harsh criticisms 
directed toward his seemingly contradictory and inconsistent behavior 
between his thought and his actions as a political practitioner; and also of 
Mill’s intention for the abstract international political thought to be built 
from his political philosophical principles. Without further adieu, we begin a 
close inspection of Mill’s key philosophical arguments. 
1. Rereading Mill’s Art of Life; Principle and Rules of Conduct
  For this task, it is necessary to turn to the concluding essay of Mill’s A 
System of Logic on his theory of the Art of Life and Science. The 
concluding essay is the last piece of writing to appear in the final book of 
Mill’s A System of Logic, Book VI on the Logic of the Moral Sciences.23) 
It clarifies what Mill means by the concept of a “moral science.” He means 
to iterate upon the relationship between that which is imperative, or ought 
23) CW, VIII, pp.943-952
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to be, from that which is indicative, or what is.24) Through this process, 
Mill also highlights the general logic that organizes the relationship between 
principles into one of a hierarchy centrally controlled by the Principle of 
Utility.25) It is precisely because of this reason that there has been a recent 
trend in referring to this essay as the general theory that links together 
Mill’s various political philosophical works, and also clearly shows the logic 
that is behind Mill’s actions vis-a-vis his thoughts.26) Before delving into 
these themes, the essay will be reviewed in detail. 
  The essay distinguishes between his two concepts of Art and Science, 
elaborates upon the two fundamentally different logics to which they abide, 
and ultimately provides a theory of their functional relationship. First, the 
concept of Art does not refer to art as used in the poetic sense, but to 
whatever part of the process of moral thinking that requires one to think in 
terms of imperatives, otherwise referred to as theorems or “speculative 
truths.”27) This is contrary to a mode of thinking that requires one to think 
in terms of the indicative mood, and in terms of the assertions of fact. Art 
involves the defining of “desirable ends” for conduct, which is strictly an 
exclusive role of Art alone.28) Mill essentially defines morality, which he 
provisionally defines as knowledge of “duties, practical ethics, or morality” 
to be strictly directed by Art.29) While explaining the concept of Art, Mill 
refers to the Ultimate Principle of Teleology as the foundation of morals, or 
the ultimate end of this Art to which all other ends are subordinate and 
secondary to.30) This principle is understood and interpreted by most as the 
24) CW, VIII, p. 943
25) CW, VIII, p. 949-952
26) Ibid., (John Gray & G. W. Smith, 1991, J. S. Mill's on Liberty in Focus), pp. 
190-211; Ibid., (Geogios Varouxakis, 2017, Liberty Abroad), pp.96-98
27) CW, VIII, p.944-945
28) CW, VIII, p.944
29) CW, VIII, p.945-946
30) CW, VIII, p.951
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Principle of Utility, the very principle that comprises Mill’s most popular 
and significant portion of his political philosophy.31)
  Outside of this essay as well as within it, Mill elaborates upon his 
understanding of the concept of Science in contradistinction to Art. His 
understanding of the concept is close to what we perceive of as the natural 
sciences, or sciences that serve the purpose of identifying the indicative 
aspects of nature through facts of reality and the scientific language of 
causation.32) A good portion of System of Logic is dedicated to analyzing 
this notion of Science, and highlighting its utility and limitations in inquiries 
about human beings and society. He speaks of psychology, physiology, and 
the possibility of a social science within this part of his book.33) However, 
he makes it clear that this notion of Science must be clearly demarcated 
from the realm of Art as explained in his concluding essay, for it is 
completely incapable of establishing whatever speaks of ends in the 
imperative mood.34) As such, Mill posits the philosophical view that the 
logic underlying Art and Science are mutually exclusive. This view is made 
concretely and conclusively in the following passage: 
‘A scientific observer or reasoner, merely as such, is not an adviser for 
practice. His part is only to show that certain consequences follow from 
certain causes, and that to obtain certain ends, certain means are the most 
effectual. Whether the ends themselves are such as ought to be pursued, and 
if so, in what cases and to how great a length, it is no part of his business 
as a cultivator of science to decide, and science alone will never qualify 
him for the decision... but those who treat of human nature and society 
31) CW, XIII, pp.949-952; CW, X, pp. 205-259, at pp.227-233, 240-259; CW, X, pp.373-402; 
CW, X, pp.403-28.
32) CW, XIII, pp.943-945, pp.947-948.
33) CW, XIII, pp.849-860
34) CW, XIII, pp.943-945, pp.947-948.
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invariably claim it; they always undertake to say, what not merely is, but 
what ought to be. The most elaborate and well-digested exposition of the 
laws of succession and coexistence among mental or social phenomena, and 
of their relation to one another as causes and effects, will be of no avail 
towards the art of Life or of Society...’35)
The last sentence of this passage on the “laws of succession and coexistence 
among mental or social phenomena” refers to the natural scientific analyses 
of the mind (physiology and psychology) and subsequently of society that 
precedes this essay in book VI of A System of Logic.36) What is somewhat 
striking is that Mill has established throughout the entirety of System of 
Logic all the metaphysical and philosophical views as well as his penetrating 
analysis on the philosophy of science only to uncompromisingly deny the 
role of Art to Science. This method of argumentation where Mill’s argument 
proceeds first by thoroughly analyzing a particular subject and then 
repudiating or limiting its implications seems to be present in a vast number 
of his works.37) This does not mean however that Mill totally negates any 
desirable function of Science; rather, Mill provides a thorough analysis and 
argument as to why the role of Science should be limited to the 
aforementioned role in contradistinction to that of Art. 
  It is the third part of the essay that is a unique and critical contribution 
of Mill, and to which this dissertation designates as crucial for 
understanding Mill’s seemingly contradictory and inconsistent behavior 
between his thought and his actions. The third part of the essay illuminates 
how the independent logic of Art and Science function together in order to 
constitute a “science of morals.”38) What Mill means by a moral science 
35) CW, XIII, p.950
36) CW, XIII, pp.849-860
37) Ibid., (Geogios Varouxakis, 2017, Liberty Abroad), pp.9-18
38) CW, XIII, pp.833-835
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here is basically morality in reality, or morality in conduct. In other words, 
Mill attempts to establish how a desirable end as designated by Art is to be 
realized in reality. Mill makes it clear that an end can only become a 
“rule,” “precept,” or “maxim” of conduct or practice if it can be realized 
according to the corresponding Science.39) Specifically, Mill states that in 
order for a theorem or speculative truth to become a precept, one must first 
designate the end as an effect in reality, and then conduct a scientific 
operation of uncovering all the causes, conditions and circumstances 
necessary for achieving that desirable effect.40) However, the major caveat is 
that Mill displays penetrating understanding of the limits of Science in 
achieving this impossible feat in human affairs.41) in the complicated affairs 
of life, states and societies; and furthermore, Mill clearly establishes his 
view that this shortcoming of Science, as opposed to the natural sciences, 
largely owes to the normative aspect of human affairs as described in Art. 
Thus, Mill claims that all rules or precepts for practice or action are always 
provisional, and account for only the most common occurrences.42) This idea 
he refers to as a borrowed language from German metaphysicians, the 
principles of Practical Reason.43)
  Furthermore, Mill makes it clear that Morality is but a, not the, only 
consideration when Art is defining and designating the proper end. Mill 
theorizes that Morality is one of three departments in the Art of Life under 
which all other ends of Art are subordinate to.44) The other two departments 
are Aesthetics, or nobility and beauty; and Prudence, which involves 
expediency and policy.45) Mill seems to place less emphasis on Aesthetics 
39) CW, XIII, pp.943-945
40) CW, XIII, pp.943-945
41) CW, XIII, pp.836-841
42) CW, XIII, pp.947
43) CW, I, p.185
44) CW, XIII, p.949, p.951
45) CW, XIII, p.949, p.951
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and Prudence on the basis of his confession that, without much elaboration, 
the ultimate principle to which all other ends in the three departments ought 
to be justified is that of Morality, and in particular the Ultimate Principle of 
Teleology.46) He refers to this principle in the following excerpt:
 “... the general principle to which all rules of practice ought to conform, 
and the test by which they should be tried, is that of conduciveness to the 
happiness of mankind, or rather, of all sentient beings: in other words, that 
the promotion of happiness is the ultimate principle of Teleology.”47)
As such, there is a general agreement amongst interpreters that the ultimate 
principle of Teleology to which Mill refers here is the Principle of Utility, 
or utilitarianism.48) Mill however makes the distinction between making this 
ultimate principle the rule of Art to which all decisions must be made, but 
rather the umpire, or axiomatic principle to decide the intrinsic value of all 
other subordinate ends or rules.49) Indeed, Mill laments the passionate fool 
who refuses to think in terms of secondary principles, and only in terms of 
the first principle of Utility.50) In other words, all other secondary principles 
from which to derive a rule of conduct are to be evaluated on their degree 
of priority through the Principle of Utility. 
46) CW, XIII, p.951
47) CW, XIII, p.951 (emphasis added)
48) Ibid., (John Gray & G. W. Smith, 1991, J. S. Mill's on Liberty in Focus), pp. 
190-211.
49) Ibid., (John Gray & G. W. Smith, 1991, J. S. Mill's on Liberty in Focus), pp. 
162-168; Ibid., (Geogios Varouxakis, 2017, Liberty Abroad), p. 81; Essays, p.148-156.
50) Essays, p.157.
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2. Mill’s Distinction between Theory and Practice: The Errors of 
Confounding Mill’s Foreign Policy with his Political Philosophy
  Now that the main ideas of this essay have been shared, it is necessary 
to make sense of it by interpreting and extracting those parts of it that are 
of the greatest significance in understanding Mill’s international political 
thought. The first point to be made is that Mill distinguished the logic of 
theory from practice, or conduct. In theory, Mill’s utilitarian ethics are 
dedicated to the happiness of the entirety of mankind, and the other 
secondary moral principles to be situationally derived from Mill’s first 
principle of utility. However, the logic of science and the departments of 
Art dictate the conditions and the practical limits within which these ideas 
can be applied as rules of conduct in the real world.51) This is an all the 
more significant finding that helps explain the difficulties and dilemmas Mill 
dealt with as not only a philosopher or moral theorist, but a philosopher 
who was actively involved in real-world politics. This problem is analogous 
to the perennial rift between ideas and reality in which certain 
“compromises” must inevitably be made by the practitioner, not the theorist, 
in practical choices. This conclusion is somewhat straightforward in basically 
arguing that moral theories or principles are distant from real world 
concerns, and that they must be applied to practice and real-world 
phenomena on a provisional basis. This is the grounds upon which John 
Stuart Mill was capable of dealing with a vast multitude of substantive 
topics and to participate in politics as a social scientific practitioner than to 
remain solely as a philosophical and moral theorist.
  The second point to be made is that Mill’s various actions, speeches and 
stances as a political practitioner on a multitude of foreign affairs issues can 
51) CW, XIII, pp.943-945
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thus not be viewed as constituting his international political philosophical or 
moral thought; rather, they are simply the actions of a politician occupied 
with as much of the real world considerations as his dedication to his ideas. 
The implicative argument is thus that Mill’s international political thought 
can, and should be derived from his main philosophical works independently 
from his practical stances on a variety of foreign affairs issues. Furthermore, 
the implication of Mill’s theory on the Art of Life extends into any 
substantive issue aside from just the international that Mill dealt with during 
his time. However, this implication does not mean that Mill’s stances on a 
number of substantive issues were entirely independent of his philosophical 
views. Rather, Mill was contemplating his views on substantive themes 
accordingly to the logic presented in the Art of Life: the moral theories of 
the Principle of Utility and Liberty were the foundation with which to 
evaluate what ought to be the conclusive stance on the substantive themes, 
and this moral assessment was accompanied by the process of Science, or 
what is, in deducing that stance. In short, Mill’s substantive views were the 
result of a certain interplay between scientific and philosophical 
contemplation.
  This leads to the third point, which is that we cannot ascertain Mill’s 
stance on a variety of substantive issues during his time, including those on 
foreign affairs, to be universal principles that are contemporarily relevant. 
The substantive views of Mill on democracy, representative government, 
empire and a vast multitude of substantive issues are not even perennial 
principles in the strict sense of the term as set forth by Mill; rather they 
were rules of conduct provisionally deduced to be applied to his own time 
and space. The concept of a principle was limited in its use to only the 
ideational arguments, and even amongst those principles it was only the 
Principle of Utility, which he refers to as the foundation of morals and the 
first principle of all morality, that was truly universal and not provisional. 
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This leads to the conclusion that Mill’s views on a variety of substantive 
issues cannot be interpreted as being directly contemporary and relevant to 
our time, and nor should they be understood as what constitute his 
international political thought, or more accurately coined, his international 
political philosophical thought.52) Though all of these substantive issues 
cannot be covered in this dissertation, it is probably safe to say that Mill 
would have disagreed with many of our current stances on substantive 
issues and the quality of tradition and norms that they exhibit. Our 
traditional understanding of democracy, or the inculcation thereof, during our 
time are probably misplaced in his eyes; that is, even in spite of his stances 
on those issues during his own time.53)
  The final implication is the most important, and provides the foundation 
for the main endeavor of this dissertation. It is the controversial argument 
from the preceding interpretation of the Art of Life, that Mill’s international 
political thought can and should be reconstructed independently of any of 
his substantive views on issues of international politics only in the language 
of his political and moral philosophy. This is deemed firstly necessary 
because the bulk of literature dealing with the international aspect of Mill’s 
works has undermined the utility of his arguments on the basis not of his 
moral theory alone, but on the basis of the falseness of his scientific, or 
situational analysis as a political practitioner. It can be said that Mill is 
highly deserving in a purely philosophical treatment of his international 
thought as is the case for a large number of political philosophers. The 
inconsistencies and contradictions attributed to Mill on account of 
international political views as a political activist are more a result of his 
identity as a political practitioner than as a political philosopher. 
52) Ibid., (Geogios Varouxakis, 2017, Liberty Abroad), p. 6-8.
53) Ibid., (John Gray & G. W. Smith, 1991, J. S. Mill's on Liberty in Focus), pp. 
131-162.
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Furthermore, this endeavor is also possible because Mill never intended, and 
explicitly never discriminated the use of his utilitarian ethics in either the 
domestic or the international; and moreover, it can be proved that Mill 
intended and encouraged for the inquirer and the philosopher to utilize his 
moral principles to deduce for himself conclusions to subjects of interest, 
since a majority of the secondary principles as well as rules of conduct are 
provisional, not universal. It is for these reasons that the following parts of 
this chapter will identify the nature of Mill’s philosophical principles: the 
legitimacy of the extension of these principles to the international will be 
examined.
3. Rereading Mill’s A System of Logic and Autobiography: Law 
of Mind, Principle and Progress
  To understand the underlying intentions with which Mill established his 
political philosophical principles, and what he understood of their nature and 
their applicability, we turn first to his Autobiography. It is first important to 
establish what Mill self-consciously perceived of on the possibilities and 
limits of his political philosophical principles, and what logic they 
functioned according to. The bulk of Mill’s insight into the nature of 
principles, and the intellectual process through which he acquired this 
knowledge in A System of Logic in chapter V of his Autobiography: A 
Crisis in My Mental History.54) As is the characteristic of an autobiography 
stating the intellectual process and concerns through which he arrived at his 
conclusions in his major philosophical works, it is difficult to provide a 
comprehensive summary of this chapter. His autobiography can be said to 
54) CW, I, pp.137-192.
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cover the entirety of his thoughts in A System of Logic and how he 
perceived of them, of which most of them are irrelevant to the main 
objective of this dissertation. That being said, here is what can be 
ascertained of as the main theme of this chapter. 
  In his chapter on his mental history, Mill mainly deals with the 
intellectual crisis he underwent in the immediate years following his 
well-known experimental education at the hands of his father, James Mill 
and his teacher Jeremy Bentham. The education of John Stuart Mill was a 
rigorous one in which he was isolated from others his age. He was well 
versed in the Greek language by the age of five, and of algebra and Latin 
at the age of nine. With the exclusion of any material dealing with 
metaphysics, religion or poetry, he was taught through the classics and the 
natural sciences, of which chemistry and physics were studied 
meticulously.55) To this kind of education, Mill replies in the fifth chapter 
that his emotions were severely suppressed while his capacity for reasons 
was forcefully developed.56) It is in his first years as a young adult that he 
experienced a crisis of lacking purpose in the ultimate ideal of utilitarianism 
when imagining if he would be happy if all the utilitarian ideals were to 
one day to be realized.57) The main theme of this chapter is how he 
recovered from this mental crisis through a discovery of his capacity for 
emotion through the reading of the poetry of Wordsworth, listening to the 
Weber’s Oberon.58) The more relevant part of this chapter is the portion in 
which he tests himself to observe if, in spite of his crisis, he was 
intellectually still in agreement with the main political philosophical tenets of 
his father and Bentham. For the most part, Mill confirms indeed that, during 
55) Ibid., (John Gray & G. W. Smith, 1991, J. S. Mill's on Liberty in Focus), pp. 
131-134.
56) CW, I, pp.137-192.
57) CW, I, pp.137-145.
58) CW, I, pp.137-145.
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these years and until his later years during which he wrote and edited the 
final edition of his autobiography, Mill never wavered in the validity of his 
dedication to utility as the foundation of morality. 59)
  However, Mill found the utilitarian ethics he had inherited as having been 
lacking in its philosophical sophistication.60) Mill states that the conflicts he 
faced in the continuous attempt to test the utilitarian ethic as well as the 
acquaintance he made with a variety of other schools of political thinking 
made him aware “of many things which that doctrine, professing to be a 
theory of government in general, ought to have made room for, and did 
not.”61) Furthermore, he states that “these things, as yet, remained with me 
rather as corrections to be made in applying the theory to practice, than as 
defects in the theory.”62) This was the main motive that drove him to write 
his System of Logic and his essay on utilitarianism, so as to refine it. 
Before explaining the incident that drove him to initiate this endeavor, the 
significance of inquiring into this particular part of Mill’s autobiography on 
mental crisis will be clarified. It is this particular part of Mill’s 
autobiography that gives life to the initially bland arguments proposed in his 
System of Logic. It clarifies the intentions and influences that drove him to 
write upon the A System of Logic culminating in the conclusion in his essay 
on the Art of Life. Furthermore, it helps deepen the understanding of  
Mill’s concept of moral and political philosophical principles, which is 
critical for the endeavor of evaluating the possibility of reconstructing an 
international political philosophical thought of on the basis of those 
principles alone. 
  To move on to the main tenets of Mill’s autobiography, the main incident 
59) CW, I, p.163, 175




that drove Mill to initiate this independent philosophical endeavor was 
Thomas Babington Macaulay’s criticism of James Mill’s Essay on 
Government in the Edinburgh Review.63) In specific, Macaulay criticized 
James Mill and Bentham’s utilitarianism for “being a theory, of proceeding 
a priori, by way of general reasoning, instead of Baconian experiment...”, 
and thus “shewed complete ignorance of Bacon’s principles, and of the 
necessary conditions of experimental investigation.”64) Put simply, Macaulay 
had an understanding of politics in which conclusions must be arrived at 
through sense observation like in the natural sciences. For this reason, he 
was critical of Bentham and Mill’s philosophical approach to politics in 
which necessary conclusions were derived independently from experience and 
from first premises. Mill is critical of his father’s response to Macaulay’s 
criticism as being a general attack on reason, and dismissing the criticism 
altogether. Mill became aware of a partial truth in Macaulay’s criticism and 
the lack of philosophical sophistication of the utilitarian ethics. 
  This is the incident that drove Mill to begin writing upon the first draft 
of A System of Logic, which he began in the early part of 1830 with his 
theory of Induction, “postponing that of Reasoning, on the ground that it is 
necessary to obtain premises before we can reason from them.”65) Through 
this revelation, Mill was able to draft the aforementioned book VI of A 
System of Logic on the Logic of the Moral Sciences; although natural 
science could in fact account for a study of human affairs through the study 
of its causes and effects, the premises from which even these studies could 
be commenced were entirely dependent upon the first premises, which Mill 
ascertained as being the subject matter of political philosophy. This leads 
Mill to reach this very conclusion, which characterizes the nature of his 
63) Ibid.
64) CW, I, p.169-170.
65) CW, I, p.165; CW, VIII, p.911-930
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concept of the principle: 
“If I am asked what system of political philosophy I substituted for that 
which, as a philosophy, I had abandoned, I answer, no system: only a 
conviction, that the true system was something much more complex and 
many sided than I had previously had any idea of, and that its office was 
to supply, not a set of model institutions, but principles from which the 
institutions suitable to any given circumstance might be deduced. The 
influences of European, that is to say, Continental thought, and especially 
those of the reaction of the nineteenth century against the eighteenth, were 
now streaming in upon me. They came from various quarters: from the 
writings of Coleridge, which I had begun to read with interest even before 
the change in my opinions; from the Coleridgians with whom I was in 
personal intercourse; from what I had read of Goethe; from Carlyle’s early 
articles in the Edinburgh and Foreign Reviews... From these sources, and 
from the acquaintances I kept up with the French literature of the time, I 
derived, among other ideas which the general turning upside down of the 
opinions of European thinkers had brought uppermost, these in particular: 
That the human mind has a certain order of possible progress, in which 
some things must precede others, an order which government and public 
instructors can modify to some, but not to an unlimited extent: That all 
questions of political institutions are relative, not absolute, and that different 
stages of human progress not only will have, but ought to have, different 
institutions: That government is always either in the hands, or passing into 
the hands, of whatever is the strongest power in society, and that what that 
power is, does not depend upon institutions, but institutions upon it: That 
any general theory or philosophy of politics supposes a previous theory of 
human progress, and that this is the same thing with a philosophy of 
history... I applied to them, and to Coleridge himself, many of Coleridge’s 
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sayings about half truths; and Goethe’s device, ‘many-sidedness,’ was one 
which I would most willingly, at this period, have taken for mine.” 66)
  This passage provides direct insight into the course of inquiring into those 
things deemed political. To recap what was mentioned right before this 
passage, Mill’s analysis of politics from a viewpoint of philosophy of 
science was that it is indispensable from beginning with the first premises 
and deducing from them whatever subsequent inquiries are to be made. It is 
from these first premises that a hierarchical structure of principles is 
established; and in this hierarchy of principles, the Ultimate Principle of 
Teleology, or Utility, is the umpiring axiomatic principle. This passage is 
highlighting the implications as well as the prerequisite presuppositions of 
this concept of the principle. He is first stating that the judgment of the 
proper institution, which can be interpreted as meaning any substantive 
judgment in politics, is completely dependent upon the principle from which 
it is deduced through the process of syllogism. This principle is not 
necessarily always one of morality, as reviewed in the previous section; the 
principle can be based upon either Prudence or Aesthetics within the Art of 
Life as well.67) The latter part of the passage highlights the implications of, 
and the implications preceding this theory of principles. 
  Firstly, it is a direct implication of this theory of principle from which 
Mill concludes that the human mind exhibits the quality of changeability. 
This implication constitutes the bulk of Mill’s theory on the Law of Mind, 
in which Mill proves that the Mind is capable of functioning independently 
of the physical and material reality.68) Thus borrowing from A System of 
Logic, the mind is not predestined by the philosophical school that Mill 
66) CW, I, p.170-171 (emphasis added).
67) CW, VIII, pp.949-951.
68) CW, VIII, pp.849-860.
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refers to as Necessity, and later on in the autobiography as “innate 
principles of German metaphysics” and its subsequent “universal principles 
of human nature,” to a certain result.69) The philosophical view of Mill is 
rather that the human mind exhibits, in contradistinction to the concept of 
Necessity, Liberty: the human mind is capable of free will and the 
conscious and deliberate selection of changing his own human nature and 
destiny.70) Indeed, Mill states elsewhere that human mind and human nature 
in its most primitive circumstances is the most wicked of men; and that 
what is required to change this initial human mind is a change in the 
circumstances to which it is attached to.71) It is these circumstances that the 
individual has the power, through Liberty or free will, to consciously choose 
what character and what life he wishes for himself, and initiate change 
towards that idea. This is the basis from which Mill concludes that the 
progress of society towards one that is more in alignment with the moral 
ideals is a possible one that requires whatever political principles and 
derivative political arrangements to be devised so as to direct the individual 
to acquire the qualities necessary for the ideals, or the principle.72) 
  Secondly, Mill speaks of the aforementioned provisional characteristic of 
institutions, or conclusions on substantive political themes as a logical 
extension of this concept of principle because when he refers to them as 
relative and not absolute. Thus, the differences in conclusions of Mill in 
themes of the same category cannot be seen as contradictory or inconsistent, 
and definitely not as absolute or perennial conclusions in themselves. It is 
only logical from Mill’s concept of the principle and its relationship with 
institutions that conclusions will always vary depending on the 
69) CW, VIII, pp.836-843.
70) Ibid.
71) Ibid.
72) Mehta, Uday Singh. Liberalism and Empire: A Study in Nineteenth-Century British 
Liberal Thought (The University of Chicago Press, 1999). 
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circumstances, and that only the principles and first premises themselves are 
unchanging. 
  Thirdly, Mill argues that the concept of the principle is predated by a 
previous theory on the philosophy of history or of historical progress. This 
understanding of the philosophy of history originates from his idea on the 
changeability of the human mind and that of the capacity to collectively 
establish the circumstances for which to best influence the individual to 
adhere to a moral ideal. Mill later concludes that basically, progress in the 
secondary principles is cumulative and culminating in a final stage of 
progress in which the closest approximation to the proper principles is 
possible.73) Mill identifies the St. Simonians and Auguste Comte, who he 
personally referred to as Mister Comte, for providing him with this theory 
of historical progress that he inherits.74) This is elaborated upon in the 
following passage.
“I was by no means prepared to go with them (St. Simonians) even this 
length; but I was greatly struck with the connected view which they for the 
first time presented to me, of the natural order of human progress; and 
especially with their division of all history into organic periods and critical 
periods. During the organic periods (they said) mankind accept with firm 
conviction some positive creed, claiming jurisdiction over all their actions, 
and containing more or less of truth and adaptation to the needs of 
humanity. Under its influence they make all the progress compatible with 
the creed, and finally outgrow it; when a period follows of criticism and 
negation, in which mankind lose their old convictions without acquiring any 
new ones, of a general or authoritative character, except the conviction that 
the old are false... Among their publications, too, there was one which 
73) CW, I, pp.171-175.
74) CW, I, pp.173.
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seemed much more definite and instructive. This was an early work of 
Auguste Comte, who then called himself, and even announced himself in the 
title page as, a pupil of Saint-Simon. In this tract M. Comte first put forth 
the doctrine which he afterwards so copiously illustrated, of the natural 
succession of three stages in every department of human knowledge –	 first 
the theological, next the metaphysical, and lastly, the positive stage; and 
contended, that social science must be subject to the same law; that the 
feudal and Catholic system was the concluding phasis of the theological 
state of social science, Protestantism the commencement and the doctrines of 
the French Revolution the consummation of the metaphysical, and that its 
positive state was yet to come... I obtained a clearer conception than ever 
before of the peculiarities of transition in opinion, and ceased to mistake the 
moral and intellectual characteristics of such an era, for the normal attributes 
of humanity. I looked forward, through the present age of loud disputes but 
generally weak convictions, to a future which shall unite the best qualities 
of the critical with the best qualities of the organic periods; unchecked 
liberty of thought, unbounded freedom of individual action in all modes not 
hurtful to other; but also, convictions as to what is right and wrong, useful 
and pernicious, deeply engraven on the feelings by early education and 
general unanimity of sentiment, and so firmly grounded in reason and in the 
true exigencies of life, that they shall not, like all former and present 
creeds, religious, ethical, and political, require to be periodically thrown off 
and replaced by others.” 75)
Mill is basically arguing in the last sentence that progress will culminate in 
the establishment of a society that adheres by the Principle of Utility as 




understands his Principle of Utility to be a perennial one. As mentioned in 
the previous section, Mill’s Principle of Utility is oft debated on whether it 
should be understood as a principle that is strictly axiomatic, or one that is 
a in itself a rule as utility maximizing. The latter is oft referred to as Act 
or Rule Utilitarianism, from which secondary principles can be deduced. 
However, as mentioned before, the general agreement in recent 
interpretations is that Mill intended for the Principle of Utility to be an 
axiomatic, umpiring principle not from which rules of conduct are to be 
derived, but for judging the priorities of conflicting principles as well as a 
principle from which to deduce the proper secondary principles.77) This topic 
will be covered in more depth in the following sections as they are relevant 
to the main objective of this dissertation. Returning to Mill’s theory of 
progress, it is simply an affirmation of the power of his principles in 
driving political society to the highest level which most closely approximates 
the moral ideals. 
4. The Role of Philosophical and Moral Principles in Historical 
Progress 
  To sum up, Mill’s concept of the principle is that of first premises or 
principles that can improve human nature and the mind for the better 
through the assuredly progressive improvement of the circumstances which 
influence the formation of the human mind and character towards liberty 
and unanimity of sentiment. Mill is in essence arguing that the principle is 
the possible prerequisite of progress towards the ideals: without the proper 
77) Ibid., (Geogios Varouxakis, 2017, Liberty Abroad), p. 81-83; Ibid., (John Gray & G. 
W. Smith, 1991, J. S. Mill's on Liberty in Focus), pp. 131-144.
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first premises to guide all other deductive secondary principles and 
substantive conclusions, mankind is incapable of progressing society.         
  Having identified the main tenets that Mill presents of the concept of 
principle, it is in turn time to evaluate how it relates to establishing his 
international political thought. However, the question is what the implications 
of this theory of principle are for the domestic as opposed to the 
international. What is clear is that Mill’s logic of the principle is meant to 
function not only within the domestic boundaries of a political collectivity, 
but to the reoccurring humanity in general as a cosmopolitan principle. It is 
on this grounds that Mill’s theory of principle can be interpreted as 
inherently a cosmopolitan concept to begin with. Through this cosmopolitan 
political theory of principle, all other secondary principles pertaining to the 
nation state, of government type, of international governance, of economy, of 
intervention and all other secondary principles and stances on substantive 
issues are to be deduced. Mill’s Principle of Liberty as expounded in this 
theory of principles does not theoretically presuppose the confines of a 
nation state; the general unanimity of sentiment in its most ideal form most 
definitely does not limit itself to any political collectivity, but rather to the 
entirety of mankind. 
  This leads to the striking conclusion that according to Mill’s philosophical 
logic as explained thus far, progress in history is only achievable when the 
first premise as well as the main principles that are derived from it are 
unconditionally designated in an international setting and when it is given a 
cosmopolitan quality: to the whole of mankind. The commonly received 
interpretation of John Stuart Mill’s utilitarian ethics is it is for the most part 
only functional within the domestic boundaries, and a majority of the 
literature has been preoccupied with exploring the domestic ramifications of 
these this principle. Varouxakis has been partially successful in identifying 
that Mill’s utilitarianism is at once dedicated morally to the whole of 
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humanity, thus concluding that Mill rather posits a cosmopolitan morality.78) 
However, he did not reach the conclusion, only discoverable through a 
proper reading of A System of Logic in conjunction with Mill’s 
Autobiography, that the placement of Mill’s two principles must necessarily 
be placed in an international setting for his theory of progress and for his 
political philosophy to properly function and achieve its goals. Thus, it is 
not simply that John Stuart Mill held a conviction of cosmopolitan morality, 
but that the placing of the morality in a cosmopolitan or international 
setting is a prerequisite step in Mill’s view of historical progress to be 
made possible.
  Some clarifications must be made as to the conclusion above. First, the 
conclusion does not mean at all that rules derived from Mill’s fundamentally 
international principles must also have as its subject matter that which is 
only international. The previous section has elaborated upon the interaction 
between Art and Science in producing the rules of conduct on the basis of 
the principles in the three departments of the Art of Life. Through this 
process, any logically coherent rule of action pertaining to all political 
matters can be deduced. Second, the international political “thought” of John 
Stuart Mill consisting of his views on an assortment of substantive foreign 
affairs issues cannot be seen to constitute his international political 
philosophical thought; rather, they are but simply the collection of the 
actions pursued by Mill as a political practitioner. The above interpretation 
of his main tenets in A System of Logic reveal that the relevant secondary 
principles as well as the substantive views of Mill on representative 
government, on despotism, empire and other foreign affairs issues were for 
the most part not purely the result of interpretations of Mill’s philosophical, 
political philosophical and moral theories, but rather an extension of them 
78) Ibid., (Geogios Varouxakis, 2017, Liberty Abroad), pp. 9-16.
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through an interaction with Science. As such, those substantive views are for 
the most part provisional, and are not truly the international political 
philosophical thought of Mill. Indeed, Mill’s views on those substantial 
issues have been interpreted as holding only instrumental value to Mill’s 
higher principles of international politics in the Principle of Utility and the 
Principle of Liberty. It was indeed the long term goal of John Stuart Mill 
that the international society became more cosmopolitan in the longer run, 
in spite of Mill’s political scientific theory of the impossibility of such feats 
in the immediate and short term future. 
  This leads to the third and most important point, which is that it is then 
necessary to expand upon Mill’s main philosophical views interpreted in this 
chapter to a purely political philosophical body of international thought. The 
preceding interpretations of Mill’s main philosophical tenets show that this 
task is none other than the “internationalization,” through a reinterpretation, 
of the main arguments set forth in Mill’s main political philosophical works: 
primarily, the principle of Utility as constantly emphasized in A System of 
Logic.79) In other words, it is none other than the interpretation of the 
principle of Utility and its main philosophical components according to an 
international context. Once again, this is possible only because, as stated in 
the conclusion of the interpretation set forth in this section, Mill’s first 
premise or principle is essentially an international or cosmopolitan principle 
to begin with; it is a principle that implies as its subject matter the entirety 
of mankind, not just simply single nation states. This is the next endeavor 
that will be conducted in the following section. 
79) CW, I, pp.173.
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III. Utility as a Cosmopolitan Morality, and Virtue
  It is now then possible to turn to the task of attempting to reread Mill’s 
main political philosophical works under the assumption that they are 
essentially international political principles. Through this task, it is possible 
to deduce from them Mill’s purely philosophical international political 
thought that is not obscured by his stances on the substantive themes of 
foreign policy. It was also concluded in the previous chapter that the 
principle of Utility must be an international principle, and understood in a 
cosmopolitan context so as to fit within Mill’s understanding of historical 
progress, and to foster in the minds of all sentient beings changes that align 
better with that principle. 
1. Rereading Chapter One of Utilitarianism: Utility as the 
Foundation of Morality
  Mill’s renowned essay Utilitarianism is reread here with the aim of 
finding the political philosophical components with which to comprise Mill’s 
international political philosophical thought. Under the previously mentioned 
logically prerequisite assumption that the main Principle of Utility is 
logically internationally oriented, an interpretation is conducted so as to first 
identify the key political philosophical components and arguments within; 
and secondly, the international implications of those central arguments are 
theorized with evidence from various works of Mill to support them in the 
following sections.80) With this in mind, Mill’s Utilitarianism is reread so as 
to first identify it’s central arguments. Mill’s Utilitarianism is divided into 
80) CW, I, pp.173.
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five chapters that can briefly be summarized as dealing with the following 
subject matter. The first chapter is dedicated to establishing the philosophical 
and logical arguments underpinning his utilitarian argument. The second 
chapter is guised as a defense of Mill to various criticisms of the utilitarian 
doctrine, but in essence it introduces a theory of the good, or the happy life 
that is essential to his utilitarian argument. The third chapter speaks more 
empirically of the motives through the human mind which legitimate the 
utilitarian argument. The fourth chapter is the least relevant to the main 
objective of this dissertation. It provides a defense of utility as the end, or 
basically the sole criterion to which all other ends are subservient. The fifth 
and final chapter deals with the distinction between morality and justice 
with the conclusive view that justice is logically similar or even the 
equivalent of utility, but as Ryan states,  “It is only in the nature of the 
sanction that they differ...” The specific details of the essay will now be 
thoroughly read through.81) 
  The first chapter once again clarifies the philosophical theories that 
presuppose Mill’s utilitarian argument. The content of the chapter is almost 
an identical restatement of what was covered in the previous section on 
Mill’s theory of the principle and of first premises. First, Mill addresses the 
“question concerning the summum bonum, or, what is the same thing, 
concerning the foundation of morality... ” as the perennial problem in all 
speculative thought.82) The summum bonum refers, simply put, to the highest 
good for man, and he uses the concept of the “foundation of morality” 
synonymously with it.83) This is the main question which he intends to 
answer throughout his essay, and to which he answers that the utilitarian 





argument, or the argument that happiness or pleasure is precisely the 
foundation of morality.84) Mill goes on to clarify the theory of the principle 
by distinguishing the different logic to which the natural sciences abide, in 
contradistinction to the case of all principles included within the “practical 
arts,” of course including the study of morals. Restating what was already 
dealt with as the main topic of A System of Logic, Mill explains that the 
sciences rely on deduction in which the “particular truths precede the 
general theory,” whereas the practical art induction, which is by consequence 
subservient to the ends which are arrived at through the completely 
independent logic of Art.85) In effect, “All action is for the sake of some 
end, and rules of action, it seems natural to suppose, must take their whole 
character and colour from the end to which they are subservient.”86) Mill 
thus concludes that all morality must be deduced from moral laws, and that 
they are evident a priori.87) However, Mill raises objection to the 
indiscriminate introduction of various maxims by many thinkers whilst 
lacking not a one that is authoritative, and also lacking a logic of 
precedence amongst them.88) Thus, he argues that it is utterly necessarily to 
establish that “one fundamental principle or law, at the root of all morality” 
that can act as an axiomatic principle to decide that lacking precedence 
when they are in conflict with one another.89) This is the principle of utility 









2. Rereading Chapter Two of Utilitarianism: Virtue as the 
Central Condition to Happiness Altogether
 
 In the second chapter, Mill intends to clear the principle of utility of gross 
misconceptions that complicate its acceptance and pervert its original 
purpose. In so doing, Mill explains, as stated in the title of the chapter, 
“what utilitarianism is.” Mill’s idea of happiness and of the utilitarian logic 
is much more complex than simply “the greatest amount of happiness for 
the greatest number.”91) Rather, Mill’s utilitarian argument is better 
interpreted within the chapter as “happiness altogether,” and that the central 
tenet of this argument is that this principle requires, as a precondition, the 
nurturing of virtue.92) By virtue, it refers to what Mill understands as a 
willingness to sacrifice his own happiness for the good of all. This is the 
central tenet that is consistently dealt with throughout the entire essay, and 
which Mill declares as the objective of utilitarian argument to nurture, 
through institutional improvement as well as the “general unanimity of 
sentiment.”93) The first passage of the essay that directly refers to this point 
is provided below.
“...for that standard is not the agent’s own greatest happiness, but the 
greatest amount of happiness altogether; and if it may possibly be doubted 
whether a noble character is always happier for its nobleness, there can be 
no doubt that it makes other people happier, and that the world in general 
is immensely a gainer by it. Utilitarianism, therefore, could only attain its 
end by the general cultivation of nobleness of character, even if each 
individual were only benefited by the nobleness of others, and his own, so 
91) Essays, 137.
92) Essays, 142.
93) CW, I, pp.173.
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far as happiness is concerned, were a sheer deduction from his benefit.”94)
This raises the question of whether or not Mill’s utilitarian argument is 
actually paradoxical in that while it argues for the happiness of all, it 
negates the happiness of the individual. To this question, Mill defends his 
argument in the passage below.
“Though it is only in a very imperfect state of the world’s arrangements 
that any one can best serve the happiness of others by the absolute sacrifice 
of his own, yet so long as the world is in that imperfect state, I fully 
acknowledge that the readiness to make such a sacrifice is the highest virtue 
which can be found in man. I will add, that in this condition of the world, 
paradoxical as the assertion may be, the conscious ability to do without 
happiness gives the best prospect of realizing such happiness as is 
attainable. For nothing except that consciousness can raise a person above 
the chances of life, by making him feel that, let fate and fortune do their 
worst, they have not power to subdue to him: which, once felt, frees him 
from excess of anxiety concerning the evils of life, and enables him, like 
many a Stoic in the worst time of the Roman Empire, to cultivate in 
tranquility the sources of satisfaction accessible to him, without concerning 
himself about the uncertainty of their duration, any more than about their 
inevitable end.”95)
Thus explained by Mill is the grounds upon which he makes the happiness 
of all consistent with the happiness of the individual. He is basically stating 
that as paradoxical as it may seem, sacrificing oneself for the happiness of 




this is the grounds upon which Mill makes sacrifice an integral part of his 
argument. However, it is of the utmost importance to distinguish between 
sacrifice seen as holding intrinsic value in itself, as opposed to sacrifice 
holding value only when it contributes to the happiness of all. 
“The utilitarian morality does recognize in human beings the power of 
sacrificing their own greatest good for the good of others. It only refuses to 
admit that the sacrifice itself is a good. A sacrifice which does not increase, 
or tend to increase, the sum total of happiness, it considers as waste. The 
only self-renunciation which it applauds, is devotion to the happiness, or to 
some of the means of happiness, of others; either of mankind collectively, 
or of the individuals within the limits imposed by the collective interests of 
mankind.”96)
Thus explained is the central tenet of Mill’s utilitarian standard. In summary, 
Mill elaborates that utility as the foundation of morality is essentially the 
maximization of happiness of the collectivity, to which it is a precondition 
that virtue, or what he also refers to as nobility, be nurtured in individuals 
to the greatest extent. He also once again makes this logic consistent with 
the happiness of the individual through the view that dedication to the 
happiness of all that individuals can truly approximate their own personal 
happiness. However, these portions of the second chapter alone cannot 
complete the utilitarian argument for the missing reasoning as  to why an 
individual’s happiness is synonymous with a virtuous dedication to the 
happiness of the collectivity. To complete the circle, we turn to Mill’s 
theory of life as set forth in this chapter. 
  Mill makes it clear that the reasoning behind the central tenets of Mill’s 
96) Essays, 148.
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utilitarian argument as summarized above is made possible from Mill’s 
theory of life. Mill states in the early part of the chapter that Mill’s 
standard of utility is based on this theory of life.97) This theory of life is 
essentially Mill’s particular definition of the good life, within which he more 
clearly defines his concept of happiness and unhappiness. Mill first explains 
that the good life of an individual is one that pursues a particular type of 
pleasure.98) Mill makes the distinction between intellectual pleasures as 
opposed to pleasures of the body, or of sensation. According to Mill, the 
truly happy life of an individual is one that is predominantly engaged with 
the intellectual as opposed to the sensational pleasures.99) He identifies the 
good life as one that is experienced in both kinds of pleasures, but after the 
dual experience would never degrade himself to a “lower grade of 
existence” by choosing the pleasures of sensation.100) As such, Mill invokes 
the saying, “It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig 
dissatisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied.”101) 
Furthermore, Mill states within his theory of life that the happiness of an 
individual is attainable, and that it is so done not through a “continuity of 
highly pleasurable excitement” but rather through “moments of such, in an 
existence made up of few and transitory pains, many and various pleasures, 
with a decided predominance of the active over the passive, and having as 
the foundation of the whole, not to expect more from life than it is capable 
of bestowing.”102) As such, Mill’s theory of life posits the view that 
happiness is not a continuous rupture, but rather short intermissions of 








the more plausible that a sacrifice of one’s own happiness, if ever 
unpleasant in the short run, may surely lead to a very rewarding, albeit 
possibly a short burst of pleasure upon seeing its contributing effect to the 
happiness of the collectivity. This still does not complete Mill’ theory of 
life. Another crucial part of Mill’s theory of life is that an individual leads 
a happy life only when he is balanced in his public and private life, or 
“affections.” He views life as being comprised of a vast number of things 
to interest, to enjoy, and to correct and improve.103) Given the conditions of 
a prevention of pain and an escape from the “positive evils of life,” such 
as “indigence, disease, and the unkindness, worthlessness or premature loss 
of objects of affection,” any individual can lead a life that is deemed 
“enviable.”104) Thus, this crucial part of Mill’s theory of life emphasizes that 
extremes of either public-mindedness or the private affections are miserable, 
and that a truly happy life is one that maintains a balance between the two. 
Thus summarized is Mill’s very particular definition of happiness founded 
upon his theory of life. 
  The final part of the second chapter is one that is directly linked to the 
third chapter. It concerns the conditions through which the virtue and of 
character of the individual can be established. But first, Mill argues that it 
is in fact possible to improve upon these conditions by referring to two key 
philosophical views presented in his System of Logic and dealt with in the 
previous chapter of this dissertation: the Law of Mind and the possible 
changeability of the human nature; and Mill’s theory of historical progress. 
In doing so, Mill makes it possible to converse upon the conditions that can 
be improved to nurture the character and virtue of individuals that is 
consistent with the utilitarian argument and the theory of life explained 




by the flexibility of the human mind.
“As the means of making the nearest approach to this ideal, utility would 
enjoin, first, that laws and social arrangements should place the happiness, 
or (as speaking practically it may be called) interest of every individual, as 
nearly as possible in harmony with the interest of the whole; and secondly, 
that education and opinion, which have so vast a power over human 
character, should so use that power as to establish in the mind of every 
individual an indissoluable association between his own happiness and the 
good of the whole; especially between his own happiness and the practice 
of such modes of conduct, negative and positive, as regard for the universal 
happiness prescribes: so that not only he may be unable to conceive the 
possibility of happiness to himself, consistently with conduct opposed to the 
general good, but also that a direct impulse to promote the general good 
may be in every individual one of the habitual motives of action, and the 
sentiments connected therewith may fill a large and prominent place in 
every human being’s sentient existence.”105)
This passage then emphasizes that so long as the human mind is capable of 
being educated and shaped so as to contribute to a virtuous character, that 
is the actual condition that must be fulfilled in order to approximate the 
utilitarian ideal. This involves not only the habitual association, through 
social arrangements, of the interest of the whole with oneself, but also the 
nurturing of the motives or sentiments, or the moral faculties. Before 
delving into the details of the moral sentiment as the ultimate sanction of 
the utilitarian standard, it is necessary to sum up the points and analyze 
their implications for the main endeavor of this dissertation. 
105) Essays, 148-149.
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  The summary of the chapter has covered the critical details of the 
utilitarian doctrine in specific. A few critical points must be made in regards 
to the material. First, it is made clear here that the central tenet of the 
utilitarian argument is as much that regarding the nurturing of virtue as it is 
about utility as the ultimate moral standard. While it is true that the 
utilitarian standard acts as an axiomatic principle that judges the precedence 
of certain principles over others, it requires that the individuals within 
society are nurtured, in character and in sentiment, to become Mill’s 
particularly defined virtuous and intellectual individual. This leads to the 
second, and most important point that the logical structure of the utilitarian 
argument is consistent with the logic of principle and progress as established 
in the previous chapter of this dissertation. In specific, the designation of 
the ultimate standard of happiness of “entire sentient creation,” not simply a 
mutually exclusive interest of a smaller political collectivity, is the necessary 
condition through which at all other lower levels down to the individual, 
progress can be made. The final stage of progress that can be made at the 
individual level is the particularly defined virtue, or nobility of the 
individual. In short, progress towards the better individual, the better 
political society, and the best international political arrangements is only 
possible through the acceptance of a utilitarian standard that is committed to 
the overall happiness of all mankind. It is thus interpreted here that it is an 
inherent quality of Mill’s utilitarian argument that the foundation of all 
goodness, at all levels of human affairs, is only possible when the ultimate 
standard is universal for the good of all mankind. In other words, the 
external morality is the prerequisite for all progress in the internal realm of 
human conduct in Mill’s utilitarian argument. This is the most critical point 
of Utilitarianism that is directly relevant to what constitutes the international 
political philosophical thought of John Stuart Mill, and will be further 
elaborated upon in the upcoming sections of this dissertation. The remaining 
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chapters are less important in comparison to this most important second 
chapter when thinking of their implications for Mill’s international political 
thought. They are mostly specifications of the logic of the utilitarian 
argument. Nonetheless, the remaining chapters will also be summarized. 
3. Rereading Chapter 3 of Utilitarianism: Moral Sentiment and 
the Changeability of Human Nature
  The third chapter of Utilitarianism is dedicated to the identifying of the 
ultimate sanctions that legitimate the utilitarian standard as the ultimate 
foundation of all morality. Mill argues that it is required for any attempt at 
the summum bonum to explain what motives or inner workings of the 
human being make that principle a legitimate one.106) Mill argues here that 
there are two main sanctions that work together to legitimate the utilitarian 
sanction: the external and the internal sanction, of which the former is a 
sanction that is common to all other systems of morals apart from the 
utilitarian standard, and where the latter is a sanction that is mostly 
exclusive to the utilitarian standard alone.107) The external sanction is “the 
hope of favour and the fear of displeasure from our fellow creatures or 
from the Ruler of the Universe, along with whatever we may have of 
sympathy or affection for them, or of love and awe of Him, inclining us to 
do his will independently of selfish consequences.”108) It is for this reason 
that Mill states that “if men believe, as most profess to do, in the goodness 
of God, those who think that conduciveness to the general happiness is the 





it is also that which God approves.”109) In short, the external sanction of 
the utilitarian standard is which is derived from the fear of a supernatural 
moral entity. Mill deals with this particular sanction concisely, noting that 
this is a sanction that is just as applicable to other systems of morals as 
much as to the utilitarian standard. The more important sanction of the 
utilitarian standard is the internal sanction, which is exclusive to the 
utilitarian standard alone. The internal sanction refers to the “conscientious,” 
subjective feeling within the individual mind that comes into pain when in 
violation of a duty of morality.110) This moral feeling is founded upon the 
natural sentiment of man: the “social feelings of mankind.”111) Of this, Mill 
states the following: 
“This firm feeling of mankind is that of the social feelings of mankind; the 
desire to be in unity with our fellow creatures, which is already a powerful 
principle in human nature, and happily one of those which tend to become 
stronger, even without express inculcation, from the influences of advancing 
civilization. The social state is at once so natural, so necessary, and so 
habitual to man, that, except in some unusual circumstances or by an effort 
of voluntary abstraction, he never conceives of himself otherwise than as a 
member of a body; and this association is riveted more and more, as 
mankind are further removed from the state of savage independence... They 
are alas familiar with the fact that of co-operating with others, and 
proposing to themselves a collective, not an individual, interest, as the aim 
(at least for the time being) of their own actions... Not only does all 
strengthening ties of social ties, and all healthy growth of society, give to 





welfare of others; it also leads him to identify his feelings more and more 
with their good, or at least with an ever greater degree of practical 
consideration for it.”112)
This leads Mill to what is considered as the ultimate stage of progress in 
his Autobiography covered previously, which is the “general unanimity of 
sentiment.”113) This is covered in brief by Mill as the “feeling of unity” 
below: 
“In an improving state of the human mind, the influences are constantly on 
the increase, which tend to generate in each individual a feeling of unity 
with all the rest; which feeling, if perfect, would make him never think of, 
or desire, any beneficial condition for himself, in the benefits of which they 
are not included.”114)
Mill argues that these feelings of unity, through the natural sentiment of 
sociability, are what make the internal sanction of the moral feeling as a 
subjective feeling resonating from within the mind of the individual, as a 
very real and powerful sanction. In fact, Mill goes on to argue that the 
internal sanction is of higher precedence to the external sanction previously 
mentioned. This is because no matter the truth and the awe evident in the 
external sanctions through an external fear of supernatural moral authority, 
and no matter the truth evident in “things in themselves” apart from the 
sensory perception of humans, the sanction that directly influences conduct 
is that of the individual’s subjective feeling.115) It is for this reason that it 
112) Essays, 164.




is interpreted here that Mill’s thinking is “empirical” and “consequential”; all 
that matters for that which relates to the principles relating to conduct must 
first be conveyed through the sensory functions of the mind. Such is the 
summary for the third chapter of Utilitarianism on the sanctions of the 
utilitarian standard.  
  There is an important question that must be answered in regards to the 
third chapter. It is the question of what the implications of Mill’s sociability 
inherent in human nature are for international politics. True, Mill intended 
for this concept to be used as a means to justify the utilitarian standard; by 
citing sociability as the underlying natural sentiment that can be strengthened 
so as to nurture the moral feelings, Mill is providing a legitimate reason for 
adopting the utilitarian doctrine as the foundation of morals. However, one 
may ask of what role sociability plays in the interaction between separate 
political collectivities. It is not a misplaced question when one ponders 
whether sociability is only a precondition of the moral feelings at the level 
of the individual. It is rather the contrary; the sociability of the individual 
as well as his moral feelings must run consistently throughout all levels of 
human existence: from the level of humanity, through the separate political 
collectivities, and down to the individual. This is an imperative that is 
attributable to Mill’s designation of the happiness of all mankind as the 
moral standard to which all other secondary principles must be subservient, 
as mentioned in the previous chapter. In essence, this leads to the 
conclusion that not only must the individual be nurtured in its sociability 
and moral feelings, but so must all other types of political collectivities in 
order for the utilitarian ideal to be approximated. This idea, as well as its 
resulting views on the necessary sociability of the state and all other 
political collectivities, will be dealt within in the following sections as well. 
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4. Rereading Chapter Four and Five of Utilitarianism: The 
Principle of Utility and Instrumental Values
  The fourth chapter of Utilitarianism is of the least importance in this 
dissertation, and deserves only a brief summarization. It has no implications 
for the international political thought of John Stuart Mill. It deals with the 
question of how the standard of utility can be proved to be the sole 
criterion of morality. Mill distinguishes here between proof in the natural 
sciences and in the any conversation pertaining to the language of 
principles.116) Since principles are basically a study of the ends of human 
conduct, the legitimacy of those ends cannot be deduced from empirical 
evidence as in the natural sciences.117) However, this is not to say that a 
knowledge of the ends cannot be established through reason. Rather, it is 
simply that principles must be reasoned in their level of priority in a 
different manner. The only method of ascertaining which of the maxims is 
the ultimate ends is by comparison.118) If all other maxims with which 
utility is compared to in their level of priority can be submitted to utility, 
then Mill argues that it can be proven that utility is the ultimate moral 
standard.119) Mill has not accomplished this feat entirely in the chapter, and 
indeed the question is left open for discussion for all time. This is because 
the maxims to which utility can potentially be compared are limitless. The 
only primary maxim to which Mill compares his standard of utility in depth 
within the chapter is that of virtue. Virtue, as distinguished from the sense 
of the term he used as an integral part of his utilitarian argument, here 






inferior to utility because virtue is only valuable as it contributes to the 
general happiness; there is no intrinsic value within virtue itself that should 
make it a higher maxim.121) This is the logic through which Mill argues 
that a majority of those things that are valued in life are through 
association to happiness, not because of some intrinsic value that they hold 
in themselves.122) Mill gives the examples of money, fame and power. Many 
individuals reply that these three are what hold most value, and thus are the 
standard by which they deduce their conduct. However, Mill similarly 
disassembles this logic by noting that the three are only valuable because 
they are conducive to the acquisition of a pleasure, or the freedom from 
displeasure.123) It is because of this implicit association that money, fame or 
power are often misunderstood to be standards of conduct in themselves. 
This is what he thinks also of the desire of music and of health as well.124) 
This phenomena he refers to as the replacement of ends by the means 
through association. It is through this logic that Mill arguably proves that 
utility is the ultimate principle of all principles. 
  This chapter offers the benefit of confirming that the characteristic of the 
utilitarian principle is that it renders everything else valuable only in their 
instrumental function, not as ends in and of themselves. However, it does 
provide also a possible limit of the utilitarian argument, which is that its 
large distance from the unlimited number of other values in human life has 
the possibility of undermining the importance that should be given to those 
values in the real experiences of life, even if in principle they are only 
instrumental. This is no more apparent than in the case of virtue, as it is 







virtue or nobility in character and sentiment of the individual and of the 
political collectivity that is conducive to the approximation of the utilitarian 
ideal of general happiness.126) Although in principle only instrumental to 
utility, virtue is so essential a part of Mill’s argument that it cannot be 
exempted from any of Mill’s substantive political philosophical thought. 
Indeed, Mill stated this in the second chapter, to which the excerpt is 
referenced once more here because of its utter importance.
“Utilitarianism, therefore, could only attain its end by the general cultivation 
of nobleness of character, even if each individual were only benefited by 
the nobleness of others, and his own, so far as happiness is concerned, 
were a sheer deduction from the benefit.
 Thus, virtue exhibits the quality of a very powerful association with Mill’s 
concept of utility and his theory of life and of happiness that renders the 
considerations of it just as, if not more important in actual conduct. This is 
also a part of Mill’s utilitarianism that has ramifications for the international 
political thought of Mill; it is that the “general unanimity of sentiment” that 
is the final stage of progress in Mill’s philosophy of history becomes the 
main objective of all other subservient goals of politics.127) This too will be 
dealt with, and organized into the international political thought of John 
Stuart Mill afterwards. 
  The fifth and final chapter of Mill’s Utilitarianism is on the relationship 
between justice and utility. Mill takes seriously the claim that justice, not 
utility, should be the foundation of morality. The central idea in Mill’s 
analysis is that the maxims of justice are also subservient to the principle of 
125) Essays, 142, 147.
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utility, without which it is characteristic of justice to produce maxims that 
cannot decide upon any priority amongst them.128) This is with the 
exception of one maxim of justice, which is that of self-defense; the will of 
the individual to protect his physical and mental existence is the only 
maxim of justice that has a higher level of obligation than that of all other 
maxims.129) This is why Mill concludes that the only principle through 
which the precedence of maxims of justice over each other is through the 
principle of utility.130) 
  Now having reread, and identified the central ideas that comprise Mill’s 
utilitarian argument, we finally turn to the task of using these ideas to 





IV. John Stuart Mill’s International Political Thought
 The next and final process is the attempt at organizing a Millian 
philosophy and theory of international politics, based on the key 
philosophical tenets as introduced above in Utilitarianism, System of Logic 
and Autobiography. However, it is required once again to clarify what the 
international political philosophical should not be misunderstood as in order 
to legitimate the endeavor of observing purely the ideational implications of 
Mill’s political philosophy. The first part thus answers the preliminary 
question of why Mill’s international political thought in the truest sense of 
the term must be found from within his core philosophical and political 
philosophical tenets, and not simply his foreign policy stances. After this has 
been completed, we finally turn to reconstructing Mill’s international political 
philosophical thought.
1. Distinguishing Mill’s International Thought from Practice
  The current tradition in which Mill’s thoughts on international politics, 
however it may be defined, consist of a sum of the collection of the 
stances he took as a political practitioner on a variety of substantive foreign 
policy issues.131) This is not to say that Mill’s thoughts on substantive 
issues of foreign policy organized as such are without any merit. Mill’s 
international political “thought” established as such provides an illustrious 
account of the ways in which a philosopher reasoned when placed within 
the very real and limiting circumstances of political practice. In fact, Mill is 
arguably one of the few philosophers to have been so deeply engaged in 
131) Ibid., (Geogios Varouxakis, 2017, Liberty Abroad), p.1-18
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not only political philosophy, but also in the actual affairs of foreign policy. 
However, such historical accounts of Mill’s international political thought 
also shows the degrading limits and failures of purely philosophical and 
political philosophical ideas as they enter into the real world of politics: the 
disparity between the ideas and practice. This does not mean that the 
philosophical ideas hold no truth or use in the realm of real politics, but 
that so long as the actual world is imperfect until it can approximate the 
political philosophical ideal, it is inevitable that the application of those 
higher principles requires immense relaxations of them, and the oscillation of 
those higher principles with much more expedient secondary principles of 
less value. This is the essence of the logic of practice introduced by Mill 
on the relationship between Art and Science as organized in the previous 
sections: Art dictates the ends, but in effect science has a harsh limiting 
effect on the implementation of those ends in practice.132) 
  Thus, what can thus be said of the current trend of amassing Mill’s 
thoughts on various substantive issues with which he arguably dealt with in 
foreign policy, is that it is inevitably doomed to be confusing and 
controversial when juxtaposed to his main political philosophical, and 
philosophical works; and that it so often criticizes those inevitable 
inconsistencies and contradictions to be the result of exclusively Mill’s 
political philosophy. For instance, Jennifer Pitts laments Mill’s controversial 
take on empire as a consequence of his political philosophy, while in 
contrast praising his teacher Bentham.133) However, this criticism is 
misplaced. The controversial stances that Mill took on various substantive 
foreign policy issues is attributable to the general disparity between ideas 
and practice in general; they are not a direct consequence of Mill’s political 
132) CW, VIII, pp. 943-945
133) Pitts, Jennifer. A Turn to Empire: The Rise of Imperial Liberalism in Britain and 
France (Princeton University Press, 2005).
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philosophy. Furthermore, had any of the other political philosophers engaged 
in political practice and policy as deeply as Mill had, they too would have 
failed in maintaining total consistency between their main philosophical 
tenets and their political actions. Thus the problem here identified is one 
that is not exclusive to John Stuart Mill, but to all of political philosophy. 
It is precisely because Mill happened to have dealt so extensively with 
political practice and foreign policy that he arouses so much controversy and 
criticism. A majority of those who inquire into Mill therefore commit the 
critical mistake of  confounding the illegitimacy of his actions with a flaw 
in Mill’s political philosophy itself. This is simply not true. Rather, Mill’s 
failures (if they are evaluated as such) in the foreign policy is attributable 
not to a flaw in his political philosophy, but rather to both Mill’s errors in 
the scientific analyses of those issues and the limitations that imposed by 
the imperfect state of affairs in reality. If one cannot distinguish Mill’s 
foreign policy stances from his political philosophy, they will always 
continue to find inconsistencies and flaws in every substantive issue that 
Mill ever dealt with. An example will be illustrated briefly so as to 
illustrate how this is so. It is the substantive theme of nationalism. 
Varouxakis has highlighted and organized systematically the thoughts of Mill 
on the substantive theme of nationalism.134) The answer is somewhat 
complex and requires careful conceptual distinctions, but it is basically that 
he viewed nationalism during his time and space as provisionally necessary. 
He does distinguish between what he refers to as “patriotism e’claire,” or 
enlightened patriotism, versus selfish nationalism; he is referring to the 
former as the only form of national sentiment that he advocates because it 
is one that encourages sentiments of pride, and a shame in the absence 
thereof, in a foreign policy that is beneficial to other nations, whereas the 
134) Ibid., (Geogios Varouxakis, 2017, Liberty Abroad), pp. 9-16.
55
latter is a national sentiment that feels oppositely pride in pursuit of selfish 
interests at the cost of the interest of others, and shame in soft and 
unassertive foreign policies.135) As Varouxakis interprets, this view of 
nationalism is consistent with Mill’s utilitarian morality because it is 
encouraging the outwards attitude of nations to be oriented towards the good 
of the greater, cosmopolitan happiness.136) However, playing devil’s advocate, 
it can also be interpreted that the advocation of the existence of the modern 
nation-state itself, and of the any form of nationalistic sentiment regardless 
of it’s orientation towards the good of other nations, is actually inconsistent 
with Mill’s utilitarian argument. For if the utilitarian argument suggests that 
all principles and rules of conduct should be subjected to the contribution to 
the happiness of all, than it is logically not coherent to advocate any 
political collectivity such as the nation-state which is arguably most 
concerned for its national interest and survival than the happiness of 
humanity. Furthermore, it can also be interpreted that any sentiment which is 
attached to a smaller level political collectivity such as the nation-state is 
automatically impossible of being directly attached to the general happiness 
of all of humanity: this is essentially similar to the inevitability of a 
sentiment of friend-enemy distinctions that arise from attachment to any 
political collectivity that is smaller than the entire world itself. Thus, nothing 
short of a cosmopolitan political governing entity, or basically some kind of 
world government is perhaps the only solution that is logically consistent 
with Mill’s utilitarian standard, and thus practically capable of approximating 
his utilitarian ideal. Is Mill’s main political and moral philosophic argument 
of utilitarianism then flawed in itself, and thus responsible for Mill’s 
affirmation of the necessity of the nation-state and of his enlightened 




Mill to conclude as he did, in spite of the fact that a direct logical 
extension of utilitarianism rather leads possibly to the conclusion of some 
form of world government? It is simply a consideration, through the 
empirical logic of Science, in the interaction with the Art, of the limitations 
and the realistic circumstances of the world that must be accounted for 
when pondering the actual rules of action. In other words, Mill’s 
advocations of the existence of the nation-state and of enlightened 
nationalism are not direct consequences of his political philosophy; they are 
more the result of his social scientific inquiry. It was politically naive to 
even ponder the question of a world government during Mill’s own time 
and space, and perhaps even today due to the lack of the necessary 
institutions, of the material conditions, and the highly segmented and 
mutually hostile sentiments of people during his time. This example shows 
how Mill’s social scientific inquiry, not his political philosophy, is 
responsible for his views on the necessity of the state and enlightened 
nationalism. 
  It has therefore been illustrated how Mill’s stances on foreign affairs were 
highly provisional and mostly instrumental conclusions to which he arrived 
at, not without consideration of his political philosophy of utilitarianism, but 
more through his scientific inquiries into those substantive themes. These 
views of Mill should thus be taken as being worthy only of being regarded 
as statements by a political commentator. They were not political 
philosophical thoughts because they were considerations of specific policy or 
practice. It then leads to the conclusion that the international political 
thought of John Stuart Mill as understood by Varouxakis and a majority of 
others is not his political philosophical thoughts, but simply his foreign 
policy stances. It is misleading to refer to these substantive views as 
constituting the “international political thought” of Mill, but rather the 
provisional foreign policy of Mill. It is also of course erroneous to refer to 
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the aggregation of Mill’s foreign policy stances to be his international 
political thought in the proper sense of the term. Rather, such an endeavor 
of Mill should be referred to as a history of Mill’s provisional foreign 
policies. It is with this distinction to Mill’s foreign policy and his political 
philosophy that we now do justice to Mill by deducing his true international 
political thought, or philosophy, directly from his most seminal political 
philosophical works. 
2. Mill’s Philosophy of International Politics: The Necessity of 
Utility as a Cosmopolitan First Principle
  
  Then it has been established that the essence of Mill’s international 
political philosophical thought does not consist of just simply the sum of 
Mill’s stances on a number of isolated foreign affairs issues; the nature of 
those stances on the substantive issues are closer to Mill’s social scientific 
inquiries than his core idea of an international political philosophy that 
consists of more fundamental principles. Thus, the international political 
thought of John Stuart Mill is highly deserving of being independently 
constructed on the basis of Mill’s central moral and political philosophical 
works. The first part of establishing Mill’s international political thought is 
through the interpretation of his System of Logic and his Autobiography on 
the theory of progress and the changeability of the mind as introduced in 
the concluding part of the third chapter of this dissertation. 
  The main idea here is that progress towards the happiness of all is only 
possible through the designation of an international first principle. This is 
made possible first by Mill’s analysis of the human mind in the final book 
of Mill’s A System of Logic. It is the analysis that the human mind is not 
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bound by the philosophical tradition of Necessity to behave in a predestined 
matter.137) Rather, the individual has the quality of Liberty, or free will, 
through which he can choose for himself, through a selection of the 
circumstances necessary, the character that he wishes to become.138) Thus, 
human nature is to Mill highly capable of change. Second, the theory of 
principle set forth by Mill establishes his view that what comprises the 
substance of that character, is the ends, or the principle. These principles are 
evident a priori, and thus function according to a different logic as opposed 
to that of the natural sciences.139) That is, the selection of the ends is done 
through not the dictates of science but through that of Art.140) It is 
according to these ends that the rules of conduct are deduced in conjunction 
with the corresponding science.141) This, in short, that a conception of the 
desirable ends precedes any analysis of science through which that end, or 
principle, is made a reality. This theory of principle is essentially a theory 
of the relationship between principles and reality. This leads to the third 
tenet of Mill’s philosophical argument, which is that progress is a concept 
that is only possible through the logical designation of a principle to begin 
with. This means that the possible developments in reality are only 
advancements so long as there is an a priori principle towards which those 
developments in reality can be made. Those developments are all the 
attempts at “bettering” life for all by changing the empirical reality that we 
live in, including the improvement of social arrangements, of education, of 
political institutions, of economy, of the individual health of all, and so on. 
Fourth, Mill’s notion of progress presents his normative argument that true 
progress is one in which the reality is made better so as to contribute to 
137) CW, VIII, pp.849-874; CW, I, pp.173.
138) CW, VIII, pp.836-848.
139) CW, I, pp.165.
140) CW, VIII, pp.943-952.
141) Ibid.
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the happiness of all. As such, Mill identifies the principle of utility as the 
only principle that must be designated so as to achieve the most advanced 
form of society in reality in which all individuals are truly happy. It was 
the interpretive argument of this dissertation in its third chapter that the 
utilitarian principle is logically an international, or cosmopolitan one in the 
sense that it embodies the goal of “liberty and general unanimity of 
sentiment” as the end stage of progress.142) The last and final conclusion is 
that progress towards that goal in reality of the general unanimity of 
sentiment and of liberty is only achievable through the designation of the 
first principle as a cosmopolitan one that transcends any principle that is 
limited to only the individual or a single political collectivity. Although by 
consequence this conclusion shares the view of Varouxakis that Mill’s central 
moral argument is one of cosmopolitan morality, it differs in the most 
crucial aspect: that progress as Mill describes it is only attainable through 
the designation of the first principle as a cosmopolitan one. This is the 
conclusive essence of Mill’s international political thought. 
  The first part of Mill’s international political thought is thus the 
philosophical reasoning that logically legitimates the view that progress is 
only possible through a cosmopolitan morality. The second part of Mill’s 
international political thought deals with showing more specifically, on a 
strictly political philosophical, as distinguished from the philosophical, basis, 
as to why it must be so that progress is possible only through the 
acceptance of a cosmopolitan morality. To address this topic, we turn to 
Mill’s Utilitarianism for the answer. The problem to solve is why it must 
be that the first principle must be found beyond the political collectivity. 
For surely, so long as the stage for individuals is primarily within the 
boundaries of his own political collectivity, then there is just as much a 
142) CW, I, pp.173
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reason for placing the first principle of utility within the confines of the 
political collectivity alone. Indeed, there is evidence within Utilitarianism 
that supports this view. It is that for a majority of individuals, all that is 
demanded of them is virtue that extends practically to his or her immediate 
surroundings in every day life.143) This can be interpreted as meaning that it 
is not even necessarily a larger political collectivity such as the state to 
which the commitment of the individual must extend; it is to those other 
individuals that are within the practical reach of his smaller community that 
the noble commitment of the individual should exist. Thus, the limiting of 
the principle of utility to not the general happiness of all sentient beings but 
to simply the smaller political collectivities is sufficient for also instigating 
those material developments necessary for nurturing virtue of character and 
of achieving the happiness of individuals.
 The answer to this problem is that Mill is inferring something about the 
relations between independent political collectivities, and therefore of 
international relations. Mill had in mind international politics as a component 
of politics that it is just as important to the end goal of “liberty and the 
general unanimity of sentiment.” Basically, international politics to Mill was 
something that was critical to the guarantee of the perpetual happiness of all 
individuals.  But it is still not clear as to whether the external behavior of 
the political collectivity need necessarily be committed to the happiness of 
other political collectivities as well. To this, there is no doubt that it must 
be so, and that in fact this is also a critical component without which the 
ultimate happiness of individuals is impossible. This is because unless the 
behavior of the state also be virtuous and committed to the benefit of other 
political collectivities, there will be a state of international affairs in which 
some states are caught up in circumstances that makes the general happiness 
143) Essays, 151.
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within the boundaries of their own collectivity impossible, or relatively much 
less possible. Thus is the presupposition inherent in the logic of Mill’s 
utilitarian argument that the fate of the political collectivity is dependent not 
only upon the virtuous character of the individuals that constitute it, but 
also that the happiness of the individual is mutually dependent upon the fate 
of his own political collectivity. Therefore, the external, or basically the 
international circumstances of the political collectivity inevitably factor 
greatly into the capacity of that collectivity to generate general happiness 
within the collectivity as well. Thus, no external behavior of a political 
collectivity is good that unilaterally maximizes his own capacity for 
happiness at the expense of the capacity of other collectivities to do the 
same because all individuals must be made happy. The external 
circumstances that can be thought of must be imagined in strict accordance 
to the central logic of Mill’s philosophical arguments. But this topic is one 
that demands elaboration in a work separate from this dissertation. 
Nonetheless, those external circumstances can at least be conceptualized and 
established here in the abstract; in fact, it must be defined in the abstract, 
for the overt specification of those circumstances demand, like considerations 
of Mill’s foreign policy stances, the inclusion of the logic of science in 
arguing their appropriateness, and to which the conclusions can only be 
provisional. Moving on, the circumstances that dictate the capacity of the 
political collectivity to in turn generate internal happiness is that of the 
physical circumstances. This is based on the second chapter of Utilitarianism 
as explained previously in this dissertation. The concept of the physical 
circumstances necessary for generating happiness can be extended into the 
frame of international politics. It will be further explained below. 
  Mill states in his Utilitarianism, as reviewed in the fourth chapter, that 
there are physical, antecedent conditions that “easily kill the tender plant of 
noble feelings”, and prevent the individual from pursuing the very narrowly 
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and discreetly defined good life as established in his theory of life.144) That 
is, the life in which the individual pursues the intellectual pleasures, is in 
enjoyment of both private and public affections, and perceives of true 
happiness as one in which his happiness is achievable only through a 
willingness to sacrifice his own happiness for the general happiness 
altogether. This paradoxical notion of happiness was noted duly in the fourth 
chapter of the dissertation.145) The physical conditions thus mentioned are 
the “positive evils of life,” such as “indigence, disease, and the unkindness, 
worthlessness or premature loss of objects of affection” which Mill has a 
dogmatic belief in the certain possibility of being rid of to a great extent in 
the future.146) it is also that of a proper education and opinion which 
inculcates the natural sentiment of sociability, and the subsequent capacity to 
feel that one is in unity with the rest.147) To be clear, the relevant passage 
is quoted once more. 
“As the means of making the nearest approach to this ideal, utility would 
enjoin, first, that laws and social arrangements should place the happiness, 
or (as speaking practically it may be called) interest of every individual, as 
nearly as possible in harmony with the interest of the whole; and secondly, 
that education and opinion, which have so vast a power over human 
character, should so use that power as to establish in the mind of every 
individual an indissoluable association between his own happiness and the 
good of the whole; especially between his own happiness and the practice 
of such modes of conduct, negative and positive, as regard for the universal 






possibility of happiness to himself, consistently with conduct opposed to the 
general good, but also that a direct impulse to promote the general good 
may be in every individual one of the habitual motives of action, and the 
sentiments connected therewith may fill a large and prominent place in 
every human being’s sentient existence.”148)
These are the physical circumstances then that must be improved, and can 
certainly can be improved, that make the utilitarian argument possible. 
Returning to the main point, then it is undoubtedly true that the external 
behavior of the political collectivity towards other collectivities directly 
influences the attainment of these physical conditions. It is all the more 
logically consistent then, that like in the case of the individual, the external 
behavior of the collectivity must also be made virtuous so that it benefits 
the physical capacity of all other collectivities to maximize their own 
general happiness, and subsequently maximize the happiness of all 
individuals. 
   These are the circumstances that necessitate virtue in the external 
behavior of the political collectivity towards others. Unless the political 
collectivity does so, then it is impossible for the state to theoretically 
uphold the general happiness internally. Thus, the utilitarian principle implies 
that there is a continuity between the individual, the political collectivity, 
and of the entire international political world. Furthermore, this is why, as it 
is interpreted in Mill’s System of Logic, that the first principle of utility 
need necessarily be consistently applied to all aspects of human affairs, in 
the domestic as well as the external realms of the political collectivity; 
without this condition being met, Mill’s notion of progress towards the end 
goals of “general unanimity of sentiment and liberty,” and of the happiness 
148) Essays, 148-149.
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of the individual cannot be realized. In other words, both the individual and 
political collectivity must designate as the standard of their moral obligation 
and sentimental commitments the happiness of all of humanity, not simply 
those surrounding him or even to the political collectivity alone. This 
argument is therefore in direct conflict with any attempt at only interpreting 
that it is sufficient to place Mill’s principle of utility within the political 
collectivity, than also outside of it. This is the conclusion that is reached in 
this dissertation through the interpretation of Mill’s utilitarianism based on 
the logic of principle and progress as explained in Mill’s System of Logic 
and his Autobiography.
  As a concluding remark, it is worth clarifying, for the sake of avoiding 
misunderstandings of the argument, that the international political thought of 
Mill as expounded here exhibits the quality of being more a moral and 
political philosophical one that is also within the branch of Morality in the 
three departments of Mill’s Art of Life. This is because this international 
political “philosophical” thought of John Stuart Mill is deduced almost solely 
from Mill’s philosophical views on principle and history, and from his 
political philosophical and moral argument of utilitarianism. In a sense, it is 
a secondary principle deduced from Mill’s first principle of utility, and 
speaks of what is mostly imperative, not what is indicative. It is by the 
implication of this quality that the international political thought shown here 
has no direct holding over the rules of conduct. As in the case of the 
principle of utility as well as all other principles, or ends, within the 
departments of the Art of Life, the rules of actual political practice must be 
deduced in conjunction with the corresponding science. 
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3. The Philosophical Mill and Empire
  The previous section has attempted to expand the key philosophical 
principles of John Stuart Mill to international politics. In other words, the 
result in the previous section is a Millian philosophy of international 
politics. It is crucial to note that the Millian philosophy of international 
politics set forth above is to be distinguished from rules of conduct, or 
practical norms pertaining to concrete themes of foreign policy. Moreover, it 
is to be distinguished from studies on the history of Mill’s foreign policy 
advocations, which is closer to a compilation of Mill’s practical thought 
rather than his philosophical principles. The final problem to now be 
returned to is the reentry into mainstream debates regarding John Stuart Mill 
and key substantive themes in international politics through the philosophical 
approach attempted in the previous section. Once again, this is for the 
purpose of illustrating how a purely philosophical approach to Mill’s works 
can lead to not only interpretations that differ from prevailing historical and 
semi-philosophical interpretations of Mill’s actions as a political practitioner, 
but it also helps to show how Mill’s purely philosophical contributions are 
in themselves undeserving of much of the criticism that they are currently 
receiving. In particular, that criticism is directed towards Mill’s philosophy 
and his advocation of imperialism. Through an examination of this 
contentious substantive debate, it will be argued here that the purely 
philosophical elements of Mill’s political thought was not inherently 
imperialistic, contrary to mainstream arguments in scholarship regarding 
Bentham and the two Mills.
  It is of course no secret that John Stuart Mill shared his father’s 
judgments of the inadequacy of Indian society, the dichotomous distinction 
between civilized and barbarous peoples, and about empire and India.149) 
Mill was in the service of the East India Company in the department of 
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correspondence at the age of seventeen, and continued to work in the 
Political Department of the East India Company throughout his life, handling 
relations with native Indian states. Mill argued forcefully for the preservation 
of the Company’s rule over the abolition of the Company and replacement 
by British direct rule. Mill ended his career in Indian politics towards the 
end of his life when rule of India was eventually forfeited by the East 
Indian Company to the British government in spite of Mill’s best efforts, 
where he also refused to remain as a member of the Indian government 
under such circumstances of direct rule in fear of the involvement of 
powerful selfish individual interests.150)
  Regarding his view of the Indian people and his thoughts on civilization 
and history, Mill agreed to and expanded his father’s initial thoughts on the 
matter: Mill not only theoretically advocated his father’s dichotomous 
distinction between barbarians and civilizations, but attempted to establish 
this theoretical dichotomy as a key principle of actual foreign affairs in 
practice.151) This, as mentioned by various authors, is all the more striking 
in spite of Mill’s original contribution to the utilitarian tradition cultivated 
first by Bentham and his father. Mill found his preceding utilitarian teachers 
to have been too narrow in their understanding of human nature; Mill 
thought that the far too simplistic utilitarianism first established by Bentham 
only tended to account for the immediate consequences of an action, 
whereas, as explained in full through a rereading of System of Logic, Mill 
attempted to take into account the effect of an action upon the formation of 
the character of individuals.152) And pertaining to this character of 
individuals, Mill expounded his theory of the Law of Mind, that human 
149) History of British India, James Mill, 6:480.
150) Affairs of India, John Stuart Mill, pp.147-53.
151) Ibid. (Affairs of India, John Stuart Mill), pp.155-56.
152) CW, I, p.170-171; CW, VIII, pp.849-860.
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nature was for the most part socially constructed and capable of change, as 
opposed to a racial, gender-based or biologically deterministic view of 
human nature.153) Thus, it is clear that Mill intended to improve 
utilitarianism so as to make it account for a wider variety of personas and 
development and progress of the society through character building of 
individuals. However, Mill also continued onwards to apply his theory of 
individual character and progress to that of “national character.”154) Thus, 
like Mill’s theory of human nature, Mill believed that the nature of the state 
could also be improved, just as an individual could strive to build his own 
character towards becoming a complex, intellectual and both public and 
private minded individual. The critical point of the debate is as to why then 
Mill continued to advocate his father’s dichotomous views of national 
characters: “advanced-backward, active-passive, industrious-sensuous, 
sober-excitable.”155) To this question, the majority of scholarly arguments 
have supported the view that it was precisely Mill’s utilitarian principle, 
combined with his particular dedication to and view of progress, of 
character, and of his utilitarian argument that Mill inevitably reached the 
conclusion of the civilization-savage dichotomy through which he justified 
empire.156) Some of the most influential arguments pertaining to this debate 
suggest that these philosophical characteristics of Mill’s utilitarianism 
inevitably leads to the justification of imperialism; that classical utilitarianism 
and liberalism as conceived and presented by Mill, is the very origin of 
imperialism. 
  One most recent and representative versions of the aforementioned kind of 
153) CW, VIII, pp.849-860.
154) CW, X, p.99.
155) Ibid., (Jennifer Pitts, 2005, A Turn to Empire: The Rise of Imperial Liberalism in 
Britain and France), pp. 134-136.
156) Ibid., pp. ; Ibid., (Mehta Uday Singh, 2005, Liberalism and Empire: A Study in 
Nineteenth-Century British Liberal Thought), pp. 46-50.
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argument is set forth by Jennifer Pitts. Pitts argues that Mill’s perfectionist 
attitude led to the adoption of a particular view of human character and 
progress that, coupled with the utilitarian principle, inevitably led Mill to 
adopt an erroneous view on civilization.157) This dichotomous view of 
civilization was the cause behind Mill’s advocation of empire, although he 
did distance himself from his father by arguing that it was crucial that the 
East India Company, as opposed to the British government, administer the 
rule of India. Pitts argues, similarly to this dissertation, that Mill considered 
his establishment of the theory of individual and state character, through his 
theory of law of mind in System of Logic, to be his greatest contribution to 
the utilitarian tradition. However, Pitts argues that Mill’s attempt at 
sophistication of the utilitarian argument and framework through the addition 
of a theory of character of states tended to inevitably align states on a 
single axis of his narrow definition of progress.158) Thus, Pitts argues that it 
was an inevitable result of Mill’s theory of a singular and specific form of 
progress, coupled with his theory of national and state character and the 
utilitarian drive legitimating “assistance” through despotism, that Mill 
advocated the dichotomy of civilization-savagery, and subsequently advocated 
empire in India. 
  To this view and similar arguments regarding the inherent flaw in Mill’s 
philosophical doctrines, the purely philosophical caricature of Mill’s 
international political thought in the previous section provides an alternative 
argument. It is that Mill’s purely political philosophical views are not 
accountable for Mill’s advocations of empire, and even if Mill’s views on 
empire and civilization can arguably be considered wrong, those decisions 
have to be distinguished from his philosophy, rather as Mill’s erroneous 
157) Ibid., (Jennifer Pitts, 2005, A Turn to Empire: The Rise of Imperial Liberalism in 
Britain and France), pp. 137-138.
158) Ibid., p. 138.
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secondary analyses, or practical thoughts and not his philosophy. To 
elaborate, we have reviewed how Mill’s utilitarian argument, as well as his 
key essays in the System of Logic clearly indicate that he is setting forth a 
purely moral argument with regards to the “foundation of morality,” or the 
first principle of all morality from which all other secondary moral 
principles can be deduced, and their hierarchical priorities evaluated.159) As 
such, Mill is suggesting his argument on the ultimate ends of morality, for 
which he answers that the cultivation of the greatest happiness of peoples 
altogether is the ultimate standard of morality; and that the approximation of 
this ultimate principle of morality requires the nurturing of individuals who 
are public-minded in spirit and willing to sacrifice their own good for the 
collectivity; and also of individuals who are equally rich in their private 
affections conducive to their happiness in the most meaningful sense.160) 
Lastly,  we have also confirmed that this is coupled with Mill’s key theories 
of character changeability and progress, which then subsequently designates 
the betterment of the aforementioned virtuous qualities of individuals as well 
as the state in its interpersonal and international relations as the ultimate 
conditions of the utilitarian principle.
 In contradiction to the views of Pitts and Mehta, there is no element 
within this purely philosophical aspect of Mill’s argument that necessarily 
leads to a wrongful, dichotomous view of civilization or an advocation of 
empire. The characteristic of a dichotomy of civilization-barbarism implies a 
very powerful sense of superiority and inferiority, and furthermore also 
suggests that the superior are authorized to deal with the inferior in an 
authoritative manner so long as it is conducive to the progress and 
development of the inferior. However, the utilitarian argument in itself does 
not necessarily lead to the authorization of this kind of suppressive 
159) Essays, 131-135. 
160) Essays, 137-146.
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authority. The addition of the forceful and authoritative element present in 
the dichotomy is a very particular or exclusive secondary extension of the 
utilitarian principle. That is, it presupposes that the forceful subjugation of 
one inferior entity is necessary for their betterment, while skipping the 
secondary debate as to then what is the best method through which all 
individuals, and all states can behave in a manner that is beneficial to the 
improvement of the virtuous character of their fellow states/individuals 
altogether conducive to their happiness. For instance, an alternative extension 
of the utilitarian argument could be the polar opposite of the 
civilization-barbarian dichotomy, such as one which believes in a normatively 
egalitarian approach to individuals and states, irrespective of each of their 
character and capabilities, as the best means through which they can 
culminate in the improvement of character and happiness altogether. Or, 
even if it is to be interpreted that there are of course differing capacities of 
states in being beneficial to the happiness of their peoples altogether, and to 
the happiness of other states altogether as well, it can still simply be said 
that there is still no element which automatically justifies the imposition of 
authority of one entity over the other just simply on the basis of their 
degree of character. Rather, it would be truer to Mill’s purely philosophical 
argument that the only justified relation between states would be that which 
is not injurious to either and is also as beneficial to the improvement of 
each society. The secondary debate, on a practical level through the 
consultation with Science as opposed to Art, would have to ensue in 
defining exactly what form of relation that should be. This debate would 
not automatically conclude that imperialism or superiority and inferiority as 
the solution.  
  As farfetched as this alternative scenario sounds in regards to its 
mismatch with Mill’s actual views on civilization and empire, the main 
point to be understood here is that the civilization-barbarian dichotomy is 
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not an automatic by-product of Mill’s utilitarian philosophy; and that the 
validity of the purely philosophical argument of Mill (that happiness 
altogether is the ultimate standard of all morality) is, and should not be, in 
no way harmed by Mill’s advocation of the dichotomy between civilization 
and barbarians. The conclusion of this analysis would be that it is premature 
to consolidate the view in scholarship to associate utilitarianism and 
progressive liberalism as purely philosophical arguments, with imperialism, as 
in the case of Pitts or Mehta. Primarily, the philosophical approach to a 
Millian philosophy of international politics thus explained here cites the 
failure of Pitts and Mehta in distinguishing between Mill’s practical thoughts 
such as his view on the necessity of force as a means to progress, and 
Mill’s purely philosophical principles regarding what should be the ultimate 
ends of politics and international politics. This is more so if it is conceded, 
as it is in the case of a large number of literature, that Mill and his father 
were ignorant of the realities of the customs and traditions of the Indian 
society. Most certainly, the contemporary evaluation of James Mill’s A 
History of British India, which John Stuart Mill also strongly advocated, is 
that both Mills had shockingly short-sighted and condescending views of the 
Indian people and their capacity for self-rule.161) This would only further 
validate the argument set forth here, that Mill’s key philosophical principles 
are still valid as valuable guiding ends of human and state action 
irrespective of the negligence that Mill showed towards India. 
  Neither does the utilitarian argument, as a philosophical argument in and 
of itself, hint at any form of Western exclusivity shunning tolerance and 
understanding of non-Western societies. Unless one decides to fall into the 
trap of total relativism, the utilitarian principle and Mill’s views on the 
proper progress of humanity exhibit qualities of being universal. If there is 
161) History of British India, James Mill, 6:480.
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ever to be rejection of the utilitarian principle as the ultimate end of 
morality and its conditions, then that rejection would reasonably have to 
occur at the philosophical level, not at the practical level which focuses on 
refuting Mill’s practical policy stances. It is upon these grounds that the 
philosophical approach caricatured in the previous sections has attempted to 
defend the purely philosophical and moral arguments that Mill presented 
from the accusation, as in the case of Mehta and Pitts, that his philosophy 
inevitably culminates in a strained dichotomy and advocation of imperialism. 
In essence, this argument has attempted to show the importance of not only 
accurately reviving the historical thinker, but transcending the limitations of 
the thinker and expanding and building upon their core philosophical tenets.
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VI. Conclusion 
  We now reach the conclusion to the two-part problem of establishing 
Mill’s international political thought. To rephrase the preliminary problem, it 
is the question of what the proper concept of international political thought 
to be inquired into is for John Stuart Mill. The second problem is that of 
the establishment of Mill’s international political thought in accordance with 
the definition of the concept concluded in the preliminary problem. To first 
state the concluding answer to the preliminary problem, the international 
political thought of John Stuart Mill in the truest sense of the term is his 
philosophy of international politics inherent in his main philosophical and 
political philosophical works. Thus, it is not what the current trend in Mill’s 
international political thought endeavors in, namely, the history of Mill’s 
foreign policy. To reiterate the reasons, it is firstly because Mill 
distinguished between principles and rules of conduct; principles are truths 
about ends that are evident to us a priori, and can be deduced from each 
other solely in and of themselves; whereas the rules of conduct, or the 
maxims of practice, are provisional in nature, and are a function of the 
interplay between principles and science. Thus, this leads to the primary 
endeavor of establishing Mill’s international political thought through solely 
his central philosophical and political philosophical works.  
  The concluding answer then to the primary problem of establishing Mill’s 
international political philosophical thought is that the betterment of our 
empirical reality is only possible through the global nurturing of virtue, or 
the willingness to sacrifice one’s own happiness for the happiness of all, 
and to be capable of perceiving this to be the paradoxical way in which an 
individual can truly achieve his own happiness. To this end, the first 
principle, or foundation of morality must necessarily be a cosmopolitan 
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morality, and it must be placed in every context of human affairs: in the 
international context as well as the domestic collectivity, and the individual. 
As such, Mill’s political philosophy presupposes the continuity in his logic 
through the individual, to the political collectivity, and ultimately to all of 
mankind. As such, virtue is not only a quality that must be inculcated only 
in the mind of the individual, but in the external behavior of the political 
collectivity and states as well. This is the ultimate conclusion that we arrive 
at, and is so doing, we have finally done justice to the memory of John 
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국문 초록
본 논문은 존 스튜어트 밀의 국제정치철학을 그의 핵심 정치철학 
및 철학 논지들로부터 재구성하는 것을 주된 탐구 주제로 하고 있다. 존 
스튜어트 밀에 대한 기존 연구는 그의 국제정치사상을 역사적으로 접근
하고자 시도해왔으나, 이는 철학가가 아닌 정치 실천가로서의 존 스튜어
트 밀에 치중하고 있다는 점에서 그 한계가 드러난다. 즉, 여태까지 진행
되어온 존 스튜어트 밀의 국제정치사상에 관한 연구는 사실상 그의 국제
정치 ‘철학’ 또는 ‘이론’ (Theory, Philosophy of International Politics)에 관
한 것이라기보다, 존 스튜어트 밀의 외교정책사에 더 가깝다고 판단하고 
있다. 이는 존 스튜어트 밀의 논리학 체계에서 드러나는 정치적 실천과 
철학 각각의 독립적인 논리에 대한 명확한 구분할 필요가 있음에도 불구
하고, 의회 의원으로서의 밀과 철학가로서의 밀을 무분별하게 섞어서 해
석하고 있다는 점에서 부족하다. 정치 실천과 정치 철학에서의 제 1 원
칙 (first principle)을 및 기타 이하 2차적인 원칙들에 관해서는 순전히 존 
스튜어트 밀의 주요 정치 철학적 논지들을 중심으로 ‘Millian’ 정치철학
적 원칙을 재구성해서 평가할 필요가 있음을 주장하고, 이를 본 논문에
서 시도하고 있다. 
이와 같은 문제의식을 바탕으로 본 논문은 존 스튜어트 밀의 논리
학 체계의 핵심 논지들과, 제 1 원칙인 공리의 원칙을 다루는 공리주의
를 기반으로 해서 존 스튜어트 밀의 국제정치철학을 구성해봤다. 기본적
으로 논리학 체계에서는 밀의 실천의 논리, 역사적 진보와 인감 심리 이
론을, 그리고 공리주의에서는 밀의 덕 (virtue)과 공동체의 행복 극대화에 
대한 정치철학적 논지를 기반으로, 개인-국가-국제사회를 관통하는 일관
된 정치철학적 기반을 구축하고자 시도했다. 즉, 사회적으로 구성되는 속
성을 지닌 인간 심리를 덕의 함양을 목적으로 진보를 이루는 것이야말로 
밀의 핵심 정치철학적 논지로 해석하고, 이와 같은 덕의 함양이 국내 사
회에서의 개인뿐만 아니라 국가간 관계에도 일관되게 적용되는 논리임을 
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주장하고 있다. 밀의 역사적 진보에 관한 이론상, 공리의 원칙라고 해석
된 제 1 원칙이 가장 초월적인 단계, 즉 국가를 초월하여 국제사회, 그리
고 국제 사회를 초월하여 ‘all sentient beings’ 에 적용되어야 한다는 핵심 
주장을 펼치고 있다. 마지막으로, 이와 같은 Millian 사상축을 기반으로 
기존에 가장 많이 다뤄지고 있는 밀의 제국 옹호라는 문제에 관하여, 기
존 역사학자 또는 사상사적 접근과는 대조되는 해석을 내놓고 있다. 즉
밀의 제국 옹호가 그의 정치철학에 내제되어 있는 내적 결함으로 인해 
발생한 것이라는 해석에서 벗어나, 그의 논리학 체계에서 드러나는 실천
의 논리에 따른 잘못된 사회과학적 판단에서 비롯된 것이며, 그의 실천
적 판단과 철학적 산물들은 구분하여 평가될 필요가 있다는 해석을 내놓
고 있다. 
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